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Abstract 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF REPUTATION THREAT AND WHISTLE-BLOWING REPORT 
SOURCE ON CHIEF AUDIT EXECUTIVES’ INVESTIGATION DECISIONS 
  
By Cynthia Peterson Guthrie, Ph.D. 
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Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
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Dissertation Director: Carolyn Strand Norman, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Accounting 
 
 
 
This study examines the effects of reputation threats and anonymous whistle-blowing 
channels on Chief Audit Executives’ (CAEs) decisions to investigate whistle-blowing 
allegations. Participants were 94 CAEs and Deputy CAEs from publicly traded 
companies in the eastern half of the United States. Participants received whistle-
blowing reports from either an anonymous or a non-anonymous source. In the high 
reputation threat condition the whistle-blowing report alleged that the wrongdoing 
was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls that 
had been previously evaluated by external auditors and the internal audit function. 
The report in the lower threat condition alleged that the wrongdoing was 
accomplished by the circumvention of internal controls. Findings show that CAEs 
found anonymous whistle-blowing reports to be significantly less credible than non-
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anonymous reports. Although CAEs assessed lower credibility ratings for the reports 
alleging wrongdoing by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal 
controls, they perceived greater personal and departmental responsibility in this 
condition.  CAEs did not, however, perceive a significant reputation threat in either 
the Exploitation or Circumvention condition. Regardless of report source credibility, 
perceived reputation threat, or felt responsibility, CAEs’ resource allocation decisions 
consistently demonstrated a determination to thoroughly investigate the allegations of 
wrongdoing and uncover the truth. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Whistle-blowing has gained new notoriety since the corporate scandals earlier this 
decade. Although whistle-blowing was previously recognized as a key factor in fraud 
deterrence by such bodies as the US Congress, the US Merit Systems Protection Board 
and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 
1992), more recent legislation gives whistle-blowers increased access to reporting 
channels as well as increased legal protection. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(hereafter, SOX) was passed by Congress to improve the quality of financial reporting by 
public companies. Section 301 (4) of SOX specifically charges the audit committee of 
public companies with establishing procedures for receiving and handling complaints 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters, and more 
specifically, with establishing a confidential and anonymous channel for such complaints. 
  Most studies on whistle-blowing were conducted before the reporting channels 
mandated by SOX were available and known to employees. However, recent evidence 
suggests that these anonymous reporting channels may not have the effect that the 
sponsors of SOX intended. The introduction of an anonymous whistle-blowing channel 
may decrease reporting intentions across all channels (Kaplan and Schultz 2007).  
    
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review (Chicago Manual of Style, 
15th ed). 
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According to a pre and post-SOX analysis of fraud cases, whistle-blowing by employees 
has decreased by over five percent since the advent of SOX and employees whose  
identities were revealed suffered significant retaliation (Dyck et al. 2007). A  
benchmarking report that complied data from 2003 through 2006 to show how 
participants use reporting hotlines indicated that 54 percent of all reports received were 
anonymous. The hotlines were most often used to report personnel management incidents 
(51 percent of calls) and only 10 percent of reports were related to corruption and fraud. 
Moreover, those reporting fraud and corruption chose to remain anonymous only 36 
percent of the time (Security Executive Council 2007). Although evidence is mixed as to 
the effectiveness of and the need for an anonymous channel to report fraud, employee 
reporting remains an important source of fraud detection (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
hereafter, PWC, 2007). 
If employee reporting is an important source of information for fraud detection 
and prevention, then the investigation of all whistle-blowing reports should be taken 
seriously by the audit committee and executive management. However, extant research 
shows that people view communications received from anonymous individuals as less 
trustworthy and as less credible (Rains 2007; Hunton and Rose 2008). Furthermore, 
source credibility has been shown to be an important factor in auditors’ judgment and 
decision making processes; information from less credible sources may be discounted 
(Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994; DeZoort et al. 2003). Consequently, follow up on whistle-
blowing reports from anonymous sources may not be given the appropriate attention by 
report recipients.  
 
     
 
  3
 
Taken as a whole, current evidence is inconclusive as to whether the SOX 
mandated anonymous whistle-blowing channels are useful and under what circumstances 
they may be more or less conducive in assisting with the desired end of decreasing 
fraudulent financial reporting. Experimental research can be especially helpful to test the 
conventional wisdom of the intent of reporting standards and regulations such as those 
that involve the whistle-blowing channel mandated by SOX (Kadous et al. 2003; Bonner 
2008). More specifically, experimental research can add insight to the still unanswered 
question posed by Hooks et al. (1994, 105), “Should anonymous reports be encouraged?” 
The current study seeks to enrich the literature by examining the impressions of and 
responses to anonymous versus non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports alleging 
fraudulent financial reporting.  
SOX charges executive management with creating, documenting, and maintaining 
a strong system of internal controls, especially over financial reporting. Furthermore, 
SOX has significantly increased the culpability of executive management if they fail to 
carry out these duties and of external auditors if they fail to detect insufficient controls. 
As a result, the role of internal audit with regard to internal control systems has expanded 
considerably. Executive management and external auditors have come to rely on internal 
audit not only to assist in establishing and documenting these control systems, but also to 
test and preserve compliance with them. Accordingly, the role of most internal audit 
functions has shifted to that of ensuring financial control compliance (Nagy and Cenker 
2007).  
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An additional outcome of SOX is the audit committee’s increasing reliance on 
internal audit and especially the Chief Audit Executive (CAE). Current professional 
guidance suggests that the CAE should report functionally to the audit committee and 
administratively to executive management (IIA 2000). Audit committee members, now 
all independent from executive management, often look to the CAE to reduce the 
information asymmetry between them and management (Raghunandan et al. 2001). In 
addition to the CAE’s roles of ensuring compliance with internal controls and serving as 
an information source, audit committees often call on the CAE to be the recipient of 
whistle-blowing reports. A recent study indicated that in the majority of companies 
responding the internal audit department had sole responsibility for documenting, 
investigating, and resolving whistle-blowing reports. Furthermore, CAEs had the 
responsibility of following up on allegations from anonymous whistle-blowers in 71 
percent of the sampled companies (Kaplan and Schultz 2006).  
Prior research has not considered a complete view of the whistle-blowing process. 
Rather the extant research has focused on whistle-blowers, what they choose to report, 
their motivations for reporting, how they choose a reporting channel, and the possible 
retaliation they encounter after their actions. A whistle-blowing report is not helpful in 
uncovering wrongdoing if it is not properly received, investigated, and resolved. A key 
element in the upstream of the whistle-blowing process is the person receiving the report 
(Hooks et al. 1994). Consequently, to understand the entire picture of the post-SOX 
environment, the subsequent actions of whistle-blowing complaint recipients should also 
be scrutinized. Read and Rama (2003) make a specific call for the examination of the 
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variations in the reactions of internal auditors to whistle-blowing reports. Accordingly, 
the current inquiry expands our understanding of whistle-blowing effectiveness by 
exploring both CAEs’ judgments about and decisions to investigate reports of alleged 
wrongdoing.  
In working with and supporting executive management, external auditors, and the 
audit committee, it is clear that the role of the CAE has become politically complex. The 
Code of Ethics of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) charges its members with 
upholding the principles of integrity, objectivity, and competency (IIA 2000). In relation 
to SOX internal control issues, the IIA’s position paper warns CAEs not to become 
involved with assisting executive management to an extent that would obstruct their 
objectivity and independence. Yet, the authors of the position paper admit that such a 
balance is difficult to maintain (IIA 2004). 
This balancing act can create and exacerbate moral dilemmas for the CAE when 
making judgments and decisions. When forming judgments and making subsequent 
decisions about a specific event or state of affairs, individuals go through the process of 
accessing pertinent existing beliefs. This process includes not only the intentional 
accessing and evaluation of such beliefs, but also the inclusion of unacknowledged 
beliefs and motives. Thus, the judgment and decision making process may include 
predecision biases that give way to motivated reasoning. Motivations may be primarily 
driven by the desire to be accurate, or by the desire or need to reach a specific conclusion. 
Self-esteem, self-preservation, the need to maintain control, and the need to maintain 
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consistency are examples of directional goals (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Kunda 
1990). 
Directional goals can be met through a variety of mechanisms. The decision 
maker may distort beliefs about herself or beliefs about others (individuals or groups), 
she may use statistical heuristics improperly or ignore them altogether, and/or she may 
process new information in a biased manner (Kunda 1990). Research shows that 
motivated reasoning can be a significant factor in accounting related judgment and 
decision making scenarios. For example, auditors’ decisions have been influenced by 
potential client loss and other client related risks (e.g. Farmer et al. 1987; Hackenback 
and Nelson 1996; Beeler and Hunton 2002; Kadous et al. 2003; Blay 2005). However, 
there is a paucity of research that explores similar phenomena with respect to internal 
auditors. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the judgment and decision 
making of an understudied but important population in accounting research, the CAE. 
The purpose of this study is, thus, to investigate the effects of reputation threats 
that may give rise to motivated reasoning and the provision of anonymous whistle-
blowing channels on CAEs’ decisions to investigate whistle-blowing allegations. To 
accomplish this, a two by two, between-participants experiment was administered to 47 
CAEs and 47 Deputy CAEs (Deputies), 83% of whom were in publicly traded 
companies.  
After reading a case study that described a whistle-blowing allegation, 
participants were asked to assess the credibility of the whistle-blowing report and allocate 
resources toward investigating the alleged wrongdoing. Study results show that CAEs 
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ascribed a lower level of credibility to anonymous whistle-blowing reports than to non-
anonymous reports. Resource allocations were not significantly different for the four 
experimental conditions. Instead, the debriefing question responses and CAE comments 
suggest that participants intentionally ignored their perceptions of credibility of the 
whistle-blowing report and purposed to fully investigate the alleged wrongdoing. CAEs 
who were told that the alleged wrongdoing was perpetrated by the exploitation of 
substantial weaknesses in internal controls that had been evaluated by the internal audit 
function did not indicate significantly different levels of perceived reputation threat than 
did CAEs who were told that the wrongdoing was perpetrated by the circumvention of 
internal controls. Moreover, reputation threat did not have a significant influence on 
CAEs’ allocation of investigatory resources. However, those in the Exploitation condition 
did indicate a significantly higher level of perceived responsibility for the wrongdoing 
than did those in the Circumvention condition. 
The responses of CAE participants were compared to those of Deputies. The 
findings suggest that CAEs appear to be motivated by accuracy and intentions to discover 
the truth about the alleged wrongdoing and that Deputies are more influenced by 
directional goals. Deputies’ credibility assessments were biased by the nature of the 
report rather than the report source. In addition, Deputies showed a tendency to revise 
their memories of prior probabilities to make them consistent with current judgments. 
This study contributes to extant theory, practice, and regulation in corporate 
governance by demonstrating how CAEs and their Deputies might respond to anonymous 
whistle-blowing reports. Overall, the results indicate that CAEs take their role as 
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investigators of alleged financial statement fraud quite seriously and are careful to not 
allow their impressions of report credibility to influence their related decisions. 
Moreover, CAEs show intent to be diligent investigators regardless of their perception of 
personal or departmental responsibility.  
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. A review of the literature 
and development of hypotheses is presented in Chapter II. The research methodology is 
described in Chapter III, followed by the data analysis and results in Chapter IV. Chapter 
V concludes the dissertation. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Whistle-Blowing 
  “Principled organizational dissent is the effort by individuals in the workplace to 
protest and/or change the organizational status quo because of their conscientious 
objection to current policy or practice” (Graham 1986, 2). Graham explained that she 
used the word principled to describe the issue at stake (e.g. justice, honesty, economy) 
and not necessarily the motive of the dissenter. Voice and exit are two forms of 
principled organizational dissent. Clearly whistle-blowing is an example of giving voice 
to one’s dissent. In Graham’s view, however, whistle-blowing is defined as using one’s 
voice through an external channel.  
Near and Miceli (1985) defined whistle-blowing “to be the disclosure by 
organizational members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employer, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect 
action” (4). In contrast to Graham’s view of whistle-blowing, Near and Miceli’s 
definition does not confine whistle-blowing allegations to those reported only through 
external channels. The more notable public cases, such as those related to Enron and 
Worldcom, involved external whistle-blowing; the media received the information, 
directly or indirectly, and made it public. However, in many of these famous whistle-
blowing incidents, external whistle-blowing became necessary after internal whistle-
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blowing was unsuccessful in eradicating the wrongdoing. The more inclusive definition 
of whistle-blowing is the most widely accepted in academic research; consequently, this 
study adopts the Near and Miceli (1985) definition. 
 
SOX Whistle-Blowing Provisions  
One overall thrust of SOX was to make board members more personally 
accountable for corporate credibility and, therefore, more attentive to the activities of 
corporate actors. The Act’s whistle-blowing provisions are intended to assist the board by 
providing better access to information about possible wrongdoing (Vandekerckhove 
2006). SOX uses two approaches to encourage corporate whistle-blowers. The first (SOX 
Section 806) involves an update of existing laws to protect whistle-blowers from 
employer retaliation after they act. The second approach mandates a mechanism for 
anonymous whistle-blowing.  
Section 301 (4) of SOX specifically charges the audit committee of public 
companies with “establishing procedures for (a) the receipt, retention, and treatment of 
complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or 
auditing matters; and (b) the confidential and anonymous submission by employees of the 
issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters” (SOX 2002). 
Moberly (2006) described this as the Structural Model and opined that this model should 
prove to be more satisfactory because it removes two significant barriers to employees 
functioning as effective corporate monitors: the corporate norm of silence, and the 
tradition of blocking and filtering whistle-blowing. Indeed, SOX’s emphasis that the 
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mandated reporting channel must provide for confidential and anonymous reporting 
shows that employee anonymity is a priority. Accordingly, this study limits its focus to 
the predictors, correlates, and effectiveness of anonymous versus non-anonymous 
whistle-blowing. There are myriad other aspects of whistle-blowing that are beyond the 
scope of this inquiry. 
 
Anonymity and Whistle-Blowing  
The Ethics of Anonymous Whistle-Blowing  
 Long before the SOX mandated channel for anonymous reporting of wrongdoing, 
ethicists and behaviorists have debated the ethics of whistle-blowing. Graham (1986, 11) 
stated, “The ethics of whistle-blowing refers to the moral appropriateness of both 
choosing whistle-blowing as a strategy and selecting whistle-blowing tactics.” The 
alternative to choose anonymous reporting plays a role in both of these decisions. An 
observer of wrongdoing has three primary options: public whistle-blowing, anonymous 
whistle-blowing, and not blowing the whistle at all. Although non-anonymous whistle-
blowing is regarded to be the most ethical option, certainly anonymous whistle-blowing 
is morally preferable to remaining silent about the wrongdoing. Accordingly, Elliston et 
al. (1985) pointed out that a rule-utilitarian perspective would support anonymous 
whistle-blowing if the option to remain anonymous promoted the practice of justifiable 
and effective whistle-blowing. On the other hand, Elliston et al. (1985) emphasized that 
anonymous whistle-blowing can create an ethical dilemma. “The means and ends 
conflict; he or she uses ignorance to promote knowledge, identifies others while hiding” 
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(152). Thus, the good that the whistle-blower is attempting to accomplish may be refuted 
by the means that he chooses to accomplish it. 
 There are at least two arguments against anonymous whistle-blowing. First, 
anonymous whistle-blowing deprives the accused of confronting the accuser. Second, is 
the concern that if many people within an organization adopt anonymous whistle-
blowing, the atmosphere will become one of secrecy and distrust. Elliston et al. (1985) 
were adamant that they did not support the idea that anonymous whistle-blowing was 
always justified; nevertheless, they did refute the above assertions. As to the first 
argument, they contended that the more serious the wrongdoing the weaker the case 
against anonymous whistle-blowing. If the wrongdoer is causing great harm, her right to 
confront her accuser becomes a secondary concern to the more important issue of 
stopping the wrongdoing. Furthermore, anonymity is justified if the likelihood of unfair 
retaliation against the whistle-blower is high. Finally, strong group cohesiveness may 
make it very difficult for a potential whistle-blower to withstand pressure to conform to 
group norms, making anonymous whistle-blowing the only practical alternative. As to the 
second argument regarding the creation of a secret and untrustworthy environment, 
Elliston et al. (1985) purported that this is unlikely and that this proposition is based on 
ignorance and not information. 
 It is unknown whether these ethical considerations were part of the actual 
discussions that took place when the authors of SOX Sections 301 and 806 included 
provisions for anonymous whistle-blowing and protections from retaliation. These 
provisions of SOX are intended to assist in the legitimization of whistle-blowing: 
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“internal reporting is not hostile, it is proof of employee loyalty” (Vandekerckhove 2006, 
183). SOX clearly supports the proposition that blowing the whistle anonymously is 
preferred to not blowing it at all.  
The Characteristics of Whistle-Blowers  
Elliston et al. (1985) and others promoted justifiable whistle-blowing as an ethical 
practice. Dozier and Miceli (1985) believed that whistle-blowers do not act from purely 
altruistic motives, but rather from a combination of altruism and egoism. Hence, they 
characterized whistle-blowing as a prosocial organizational behavior. It is intended to 
benefit the whistle-blower as well as the organization and/or other employees. Berry 
(2004) concurred, labeling whistle-blowing as an organizational citizenship behavior. 
Extant research that has examined individual traits and circumstances as possible 
predictors or correlates of whistle-blowing behavior corroborates this positive view of 
whistle-blowers.  
Several significant studies in the whistle-blowing literature, including those 
examining the characteristics of whistle-blowers, used data from a series of surveys of 
federal employees that were collected after the passage of specific legislation. In the first 
and largest of these studies, the US Merit Systems Protection Board collected anonymous 
survey data in 1980 from employees in 15 major federal agencies (n = 8,587). The federal 
law that precipitated the 1980 US Merit Systems Protection Board study was the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 (CRSA) that was designed to protect employees of the 
federal government. Largely due to the ineffectiveness of the 1978 legislation, the US 
Congress passed an amendment to the CRSA, the Whistleblower Protection Act, in 1989. 
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They amended it again in 1994 (Johnson 2003). These acts were among other federal and 
state laws passed long before the arrival of SOX in 2002 with the goal of both 
encouraging and protecting whistle-blowers.  
In a study using US Merit Systems Protection Board data obtained from the 1983 
survey responses of 4,897 federal employees, Miceli and Near (1988) examined the 
individual and situational correlates of whistle-blowers. These authors analyzed the 
responses using one way ANOVA and a series of planned contrasts and found that, 
compared to inactive observers, whistle-blowers had more positive job responses (e.g. 
satisfaction with job overall and the appraisal system) and were more likely to have 
professional status (both differences in means significant at p < .001). In addition, 
whistle-blowers tended to have more idiosyncratic credits. Two of these measures, longer 
service and number of service awards in the past two years, were significant at p < .01. 
The third, being male, was significant at p < .001. Although Miceli and Near (1988) did 
not statistically contrast anonymous whistle-blowers with identified whistle-blowers, they 
did provide the means and standard deviations (SD) of both groups. Identified whistle-
blowers were more likely to have professional status (mean 0.57, SD 2.06) than 
anonymous reporters (mean -0.19, SD 2.41), but were less likely to have a positive job 
response (mean 0.62, SD 3.76) than anonymous reporters (mean 1.09, SD 3.63). Means 
of the other measures reported above were similar for identified and anonymous whistle-
blowers. 
Later, in 1996, Near and Miceli summarized 18 prior studies, ranging from 1984 
though 1995, to examine personal characteristics as predictors of whistle-blowing. Near 
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and Miceli (1996) concluded that although personality characteristics are not consistently 
related to whistle-blowing, the results do indicate that whistle-blowers tend to be older, 
have higher levels of education, have longer tenure within their organizations, hold 
supervisory or professional status, and tend to be male. There was also some indication 
that whistle-blowers have higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment. Although the analysis technique did not qualify the study as a meta-
analysis, it is interesting to note that none of the summary findings showed characteristics 
that would be indicative of the unstable individuals or disgruntled employees.  
In a survey of 725 managers, Keenan (2000) examined the relationships of both 
differences in managerial levels and moral perceptions of wrongdoing with the intent to 
blow the whistle. Participants were randomly selected from a US national database by a 
private marketing research firm. The questionnaire was sent to 1,000 upper-level, 1,500 
mid-level, and 3,500 first-level managers. The number of usable responses from each 
group was 131 upper-level, 188 mid-level, and 408 first-level. Keenan (2002) found that 
upper-level managers were more likely than both mid-level and first-level managers to 
indicate an intention of whistle-blowing after encountering either more serious or less 
serious wrongdoing. In contrast, moral perceptions of what was a serious versus a less 
serious wrongdoing were not significantly different among the three groups. 
In a meta-analysis of 26 whistle-blowing studies that were conducted from 1982 
through 2003, Mesmer-Mangus and Viswesvaran  (henceforth, MMV, 2005) concluded 
that, overall, whistle-blowers tended to have favorable characteristics. The MMV 
analysis differentiated between studies that examined whistle-blowing intent and those 
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that examined actual whistle-blowing behavior. They reported that gender and tenure had 
higher correlations to actual whistle-blowing than to whistle-blowing intent. Moreover, 
they found that females were slightly more likely to be whistle-blowers than males. This 
is in contrast to Miceli and Near (1988) and Near and Miceli (1996) whose findings 
suggested that whistle-blowers were more likely to be male. MMV also reported that job 
level had a similar relationship to whistle-blowing intent and actual activity; both 
correlations were small effects. Ethical judgment was moderately correlated with whistle-
blowing intent, but not correlated with actual reporting. 
Current research offers no convincing conclusions about specific whistle-blower 
characteristics. Nevertheless, it does provide an overall picture of individuals who would 
be regarded positively, rather than negatively, in most organizations. Although these 
studies do not allow us to delineate the characteristics of anonymous whistle-blowers 
from those of non-anonymous whistle-blowers, they do allow us to proscribe these 
general positive qualities to both groups. An anonymous whistle-blower is, after all, a 
whistle-blower. 
The Expected Efficacy of Whistle-Blowing  
What determines whether the act of whistle-blowing has been effective? A legal 
definition may evaluate the ratio of court cases in which the wrongdoer was successfully 
prosecuted to those in which the alleged wrongdoer was not punished. Near and Miceli 
(1995) took a broader view and defined whistle-blowing effectiveness in terms of 
“whether the whistle-blower accomplished what he or she set out to do – namely, the 
implementation of organizational change…” (681). In one of their analyses of the 1980 
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US Merit Systems Protection Board data (n = 8,587), Near and Miceli (1985) found that 
80 percent of respondents chose efficacy as one of the two most important outcome 
factors that influenced their choice to report wrongdoing. The researchers summarized 
their overall findings: whistle-blowers were likely to act only if they perceived the 
incident of wrongdoing to be serious enough that they felt compelled to report it, if they 
were aware of the available reporting channels, and if they believed their efforts would 
result in the discontinuation of the wrongful act.  
Another survey-based study of 3,288 military and civil service employees on a 
US military base revealed that the primary reason (43.1 percent) that non-reporters of 
wrongdoing gave for not blowing the whistle was that nothing could be done about the 
issue. This compares to the 10 percent who did not report because they thought that 
nothing would be done about the issue. In sum, expected lack of efficacy was the reason 
for not blowing the whistle for over 53 percent of inactive observers (Near et al. 2004). 
The effectiveness model presented by Near and Miceli (1995) outlined three 
individual (as opposed to situational) predictor variables that affect the outcome of 
whistle-blowing. These were the characteristics of the whistle-blower, the characteristics 
of the complaint recipient, and the characteristics of the wrongdoer. Furthermore, Near 
and Miceli (1995) identified the power and credibility of each of these three actors as 
being key components of their effectiveness characteristics. Employees possessing higher 
level positions, longer tenure, higher levels of education, professional status, and 
membership in the majority group have more power within the organization. It follows 
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that individuals with more power will have a greater influence as whistle-blowers and are 
more likely to create change within the organization.  
Miceli and Near (2002) conducted a three-part study designed to test whistle-
blowing effectiveness derived from power theories. The first study was an analysis of the 
US Merit Systems Protection Board 1980 data (n = 8,587). The second of the three 
studies employed a 25-page questionnaire completed by Directors of Internal Audit in 
North America. Only data from respondents that had personally observed or obtained 
direct evidence of wrongdoing during the last 12 months and had reported it were 
included in the analysis for this second study (n = 690). The third study focused on 
civilian employees in agencies of the federal government. Only the responses of those 
who had experienced and reported sexual harassment were analyzed in the third study (n 
= 324). After summarizing the results of all three studies, Miceli and Near (2002) found 
that whistle-blowers perceived that reporting wrongdoing was more likely to be effective 
when the whistle-blowers had more power as reflected in the legitimacy of their roles and 
the support of others. 
Along with power, the whistle-blower’s credibility is a primary determinant of 
whistle-blowing effectiveness (Near and Miceli 1995). Minority influence theory submits 
that a group member who holds a view that is not held by the majority of the group may 
still influence the group’s decisions and processes. The minority member’s ability to do 
so is based on his competence, objectivity, and credibility (Miceli and Near 2002). A 
more credible whistle-blower is expected to lead to higher levels of reporting 
effectiveness by influencing the group (i.e. the organization) to terminate the 
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wrongdoing. Employees who have higher levels of performance and satisfaction at work 
and have higher levels of organizational commitment also appear to have less of a motive 
to harm the organization by making inaccurate allegations. Consequently, Near and 
Miceli (1995) listed these three characteristics: performance, satisfaction, and 
commitment, as potential operationalizations of credibility.  
Source Credibility 
Research shows that source credibility is an important criterion in judgment and 
decision making. Rains (2007) investigated the impact of anonymity on perceptions of 
source credibility in computer mediated group communication. Two competing 
hypotheses were advanced and tested: the discounting prediction that anonymity would 
undermine perceptions of group member contributions and decision outcomes, as 
opposed to the benevolent prediction that anonymity would have a positive impact. 
Testing the competing hypotheses in a single study allows for more conclusive findings 
because methods, samples, and electronic systems are the same (Rains 2007). This study 
used a 2 x 2 between-subjects design with 82 undergraduate communications students as 
participants. The dependent variables measured were communicator credibility, 
influence, perceived anonymity, group effectiveness, and satisfaction. Three dimensions 
of communicator credibility were included: competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill. 
Each of these was measured with six items on a 10-point semantic differential scale and 
reliability coefficients measured .85, .84, and .82 respectively. Correlations among the 
three ranged from .71 to .77 and all were significant at p < .01. A four-item measure 
established the participants’ perceptions of the relative anonymity of the confederate. 
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This determination was important in distinguishing between a true anonymous condition 
and an assigned anonymous condition in which the participants thought they knew or 
could guess the confederate’s identity. 
Data analysis revealed that when controlling for participant perceptions of 
confederate anonymity, the anonymous confederate was less trustworthy, less persuasive, 
had less goodwill toward the group, and was associated with more negative-irrelevant 
thoughts. Lower competence was marginally significant. Furthermore, perceived 
anonymity of the confederate was associated with negative decision shifts. However, 
anonymity did not appear to affect members’ satisfaction with decisions or perceptions of 
decision quality. 
Source credibility can also be a key factor in audit judgment and decision making. 
Bamber (1983) designed a study to explore audit managers’ sensitivity to the reliability 
of the senior auditor who provided information and opinions on important issues. He 
noted that two factors determined the information content of audit evidence: the potential 
content of the audit procedures themselves and the reliability of the senior auditor. 
Bamber’s (1983) findings supported his conclusion that auditors did not ignore their prior 
beliefs (e.g. their assessment of the quality of internal controls) when evaluating new 
information and making a judgment. Nonetheless, he found that variations in source 
reliability had a significant effect on information content. Furthermore, because auditors 
excessively discounted the diagnosticity of information in a lower reliability scenario, 
Bamber (1983) concluded that audit managers may underutilize information from a less 
than reliable source. 
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 In two separate experiments, Hirst (1994) investigated auditor sensitivity to 
source reliability. Participants were practicing auditors with 101 (mean experience of 
56.5 months) participating in Study 1 and 84 (mean experience of 66.3 months) 
participating in Study 2. In the first study, he manipulated source competence and 
objectivity and found that auditors were sensitive to both factors. The second study 
examined the relationship between source credibility and the verifiability of reported 
evidence. Results indicated, again, that auditors were sensitive to source objectivity. 
However, the author did not find support for the hypothesis that when an explanation was 
easier to verify that auditors would assume a more truthful report. Hirst’s (1994) overall 
conclusion was that auditors rely more heavily on information from more objective and 
more competent sources and discount information from less objective and less competent 
sources. 
DeZoort, et al. (2003) examined the effect of several source credibility variables 
on audit committee members’ (ACM) decisions to support an audit adjustment. 
Participants were 131 ACMs with mean experience as a committee member of 12.7 
years. The three source variables were report timing (interim or year end), forecast (over 
or under analysts’ forecasts), and auditor consistency (auditor relents on recommendation 
of adjustment or auditor stands her ground). Results indicated that both adjustment timing 
and auditor consistency were significant. In a supplemental analysis of debriefing 
questions, DeZoort et al. (2003) report that 14 ACMs specifically mentioned the 
credibility of the auditors in accepting the recommendation for the adjustment. Moreover, 
12 ACMs (most of whom were in the inconsistent auditor recommendation condition) 
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remarked that management’s credibility influenced their decision. Hence, the inconsistent 
position of the auditor appears to have decreased her credibility while enhancing the 
credibility of management. 
Hunton and Rose (2008) conducted one of the few studies that examined the 
credibility ascribed to anonymous versus non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports. Using 
a 2 x 2 between–subjects experimental design they manipulated report source (whether a 
whistle-blowing report was made anonymously or non-anonymously) and the level of 
reputation threat to the ACM who received the report. If the allegations in the report were 
true, the subject company was faced with restating financial statements. This restatement 
would involve only the subject company for the lower threat condition. For ACMs in the 
higher reputation threat condition, the accounting issue in question had a high likelihood 
of also affecting another company in the industry. The participant was also a board 
member of this related company. The dependent variables were the ACM’s assessment of 
the credibility of the whistle-blowing report and the amount of financial resources that 
the ACM allocated to investigate the whistle-blowing allegation.  
Participants were 83 experienced ACMs with significant work experience. Over 
74 percent were certified public accountants. Two primary analyses were conducted 
using ANOVA, one with each dependent variable. With the assessment of credibility as 
the dependent variable, the main effect of report source was significant. The means for 
credibility assessments were significantly lower for anonymous reports (45.12) than for 
non-anonymous reports (78.50). Hence, the hypothesis that ACMs would perceive 
anonymous whistle-blowing reports to be less credible than non-anonymous reports was 
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supported. The interaction between the report source and reputation threat variables was 
significant. Therefore, the prediction that the difference in perceived credibility of a 
whistle-blowing report between anonymous and non-anonymous reporting would be 
significantly greater when a reputation threat was present relative to absent was also 
supported. 
When the dollar value of resource allocation was the dependent variable, report 
source was significant and the mean of resources allocated to investigate anonymous 
reports was $24,420 compared to $39,500 allocated to non-anonymous reports. 
Consequently, the prediction that ACMs would allocate fewer resources to investigate 
anonymous, as compared to non-anonymous reports, was supported. However, the 
interaction between the report source and reputation threat variables was insignificant. 
Accordingly, there was insufficient support for the prediction that the difference in 
resource allocation between anonymous and non-anonymous reporting would be 
significantly greater when a reputation threat was present. 
Hunton and Rose (2008) then conducted a path analysis to determine whether the 
perception of credibility mediated the relationship between the independent variables and 
the investigatory resource allocation. Goodness of fit measures for this analysis showed 
that the model fit was satisfactory. The final model showed that the relationship between 
whistle-blowing report source and reputation threat and the investigatory resource 
allocation was partially mediated by the perceived credibility of the allegation. ACMs in 
all experimental conditions agreed that non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports were 
more helpful than anonymous reports. Similarly, they indicated that anonymous reports 
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were not very useful to the board of directors. Nevertheless, members did not view 
anonymous reports to be any more time consuming or difficult or require more expertise 
to investigate than non-anonymous reports. Furthermore, ACMs did not believe that the 
regulations requiring anonymous whistle-blowing channels make the organization any 
more or less effective in preventing fraud or unethical behavior (Hunton and Rose 2008). 
The results from this study suggested that anonymous whistle-blowing reports 
were considered less credible than non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports. Although 
experimental designs have limitations they do allow researchers to ascertain causal 
relationships. The fact that participants in this study were ACMs with a high level of 
financial expertise, dealing with a real-world accounting task, makes these results more 
resilient to the lack of generalizability that is considered a shortcoming of experimental 
studies. 
In addition to the power and credibility ascribed to the whistle-blower, the 
efficacy of a whistle-blowing report is also dependent on the decisions and actions of the 
complaint recipient. The whistle-blower presents, anonymously or non-anonymously, the 
complaint recipient with the whistle-blowing allegation usually accompanied by some 
statement or piece of evidence. The complaint recipient then has several decisions to 
make and this decision process may not be sequential. What is the likelihood that 
wrongdoing has occurred? How serious is it? Who is involved? Will I investigate the 
allegation? Do I have enough evidence? How do I go about gathering more? If the 
whistle-blower has chosen anonymity, the complaint recipient is more likely to be stifled 
in attempts to seek additional information. When evidence is sketchy or contradictory, the 
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report recipient may rely even more heavily on the credibility of the complainant (Miceli 
and Near 1992). Clearly, a compliant recipient can evaluate the power and credibility of a 
known whistle-blower. In contrast, the credibility of an anonymous whistle-blower is 
undeterminable.  
There are at least three reasons that anonymous whistle-blowers risk their 
effectiveness. First, the complaint recipient cannot observe the whistle-blower’s 
characteristics or evaluate the individual’s power and credibility. Next, in line with 
Elliston et al.’s (1985) arguments, organization members may discount the concerns of 
one who is unwilling to confront the target of his allegations. Finally, anonymous reports 
may be more time consuming and difficult to investigate because the complaint recipient 
is unable to enlist the whistle-blower’s help in gathering the required evidence (Miceli 
and Near 1992). If the effectiveness of the outcome of a whistle-blowing allegation is of 
primary importance to a whistle-blower and if efficacy depends at least partly on the 
power and credibility of the whistle-blower, why do some whistle-blowers choose to 
remain anonymous? 
The Choice to Remain Anonymous 
The Social Information Processing Model of Whistle-Blowing Decisions 
developed by Gundlach et al. (2003) shows the cost-benefit analysis of blowing the 
whistle as a key in the decision making process. The whistle-blower must weigh the 
economic and psychological costs of acting against the expected benefits. Presumably, 
whistle-blowers who choose to remain anonymous have considered the costs and benefits 
of both the choice to report the wrongdoing and the choice to remain anonymous. As 
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highlighted by Elliston et al. (1985), anonymous whistle-blowing becomes more justified 
when the seriousness of the wrongdoing is greater and there is fear of unfair retaliation. 
It is quite possible that the seriousness of wrongdoing and the fear of retaliation 
for any given situation are linked. A more serious wrongdoing may indicate that the 
organization or a group within the organization depends more heavily on the continuance 
of the wrongdoing. Consequently, there may be stronger resistance to change leading to a 
greater probability of retaliation (Miceli and Near 1992). Gundlach et al. (2003) 
considered the power of the whistle-blower and the power of the wrongdoer as 
moderators in the decision process. They opined that individuals may be more 
intimidated when the wrongdoer is a high status member of the organization. Thus, even 
without the possible interaction of retaliation, a higher status wrongdoer may be another 
factor that influences anonymous whistle-blowing.  
Three studies that used the 1980 US Merit Systems Protection Board data 
examined the motivations of anonymous and non-anonymous whistle-blowers (Miceli 
and Near 1984; 1985; Miceli et al. 1988). In the earliest study (Miceli and Near 1984), 
the researchers used MANOVA to determine whether statistically significant differences 
existed in the belief sets of groups of whistle-blowers. Three factors emerged, explaining 
over 95 percent of the variance, in the follow up discriminant analysis. The first was the 
belief set of non-observers of wrongdoing. The second and third were the belief sets of 
internal whistle-blowers and external whistle-blowers, respectively. Among the three 
groups, internal whistle-blowers were the least likely to express the belief that the 
availability of an anonymous channel would encourage them to blow the whistle. Non-
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observers were the most likely to believe that they would not be retaliated against. 
Perhaps non-observers would reconsider this belief if they observed a wrongdoing and 
faced the whistle-blowing decision. 
The second study (Miceli and Near 1985) used the same analysis methodology, 
but focused on 11 circumstance and 12 control variables (a variety of belief and position 
variables). Two factors emerged in this analysis, all whistle-blowers and the combined 
group of non-observers and inactive observers. Agreement with the question “anonymity 
would encourage me to blow the whistle” was significantly lower for whistle-blowers 
than the non-observer and inactive observer group. It appeared that those who chose to 
report wrongdoing felt strongly enough to act regardless of the availability of the choice 
to remain anonymous. 
Following Elliston et al. (1985) and Graham’s (1986) moral reasoning on the 
justifiability of anonymous whistle-blowing, Miceli et al. (1988) hypothesized that 
anonymous whistle-blowers would observe more serious wrongdoing than those 
reporting and revealing their identities. In addition, they predicted that anonymous 
whistle-blowers would expect that a confidential channel would be responsive to reports 
of wrongdoing. Furthermore, they hypothesized that anonymous whistle-blowers were 
more likely than identified reporters to expect retaliation, work in organizations with less 
supportive climates, and believe that the complaint recipient would protect their identity. 
Contrary to their expectations, Miceli et al. (1988) found that employees who reported 
anonymously through internal and external channels tended to observe less serious 
wrongdoing than those who identified themselves. Seriousness was more strongly related 
 
     
 
  28
 
to identified whistle-blowing and, more specifically, to external rather than internal 
channels. Another unexpected finding was that reporters using anonymous internal 
channels believed that their organizations were, overall, supportive of whistle-blowing 
which suggested a lower threat of retaliation. As expected, whistle-blowers reporting 
anonymously, but externally, were most likely to expect retaliation.  
 In addition to examining issues of efficacy, the Near et. al (2004) study explored 
the effect of the type of wrongdoing on the whistle-blowing process. Participants were 
3,288 military and civil service employees. Variables included seven categories of 
wrongdoing (more serious to less serious), the choice to report or remain inactive, and the 
reason for not reporting. Of those who observed and reported a wrongdoing, 76.9 percent 
identified themselves and 23.1 percent remained anonymous. This ratio of non-
anonymous to anonymous whistle-blowers did not vary significantly regardless of the 
type (seriousness) of the wrongdoing. 
The recent benchmarking report released by the Security Executive Council 
(2007) supported the earlier findings of Miceli et al. (1988). The data collected for the 
report showed that the seriousness of wrongdoing had a stronger relationship with non-
anonymous reporting; only 36 percent of individuals who reported fraud and corruption 
(a more serious wrongdoing) chose to remain anonymous compared to the overall rate for 
anonymity of 54 percent. 
Two studies used data collected over a 13 year time period (Near et al. 1995; 
Miceli et al. 1999). In the first study, the researchers focused on retaliation. They found 
that by the final time period, 1992, some measures of power (high performance ratings 
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and being white) of the whistle-blower seem to be related to lower levels of retaliation; 
however, having a professional position was not related (Near et al. 1995). The most 
significant predictor of retaliation was lack of supervisor and management support.   
The 1999 study revealed the more significant and interesting findings. This 
analysis showed that the proportion of respondents who observed wrongdoing and 
followed through with whistle-blowing reports increased over the period from 30 percent 
in 1980 to 51 percent in 1992. Similarly, the percentage of anonymous reporters 
increased from 28 percent to 46 percent over the same time period. Although the Civil 
Service Reform Act included whistle-blower protections, the incidence of retaliation 
increased from 19 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 1983 and again to 38 percent in 1992 
(Miceli et al. 1999). Hence, this research showed that the various versions of the Whistle-
Blowing Protection Act (WPA) had mixed results. While they appear to have promoted 
whistle-blowing overall, they do not seem to have been effective in accomplishing the 
goal of protecting whistle-blowers. Similar to this evidence that the various versions of 
the WPA have failed to protect whistle-blowers, there are post-SOX studies that suggest 
the whistle-blowing related provisions of SOX may not have achieved some of the key 
objectives.  
Kaplan and Schultz (2007) designed an experiment to investigate the effect of 
type of wrongdoing, the quality of the internal audit department, and the availability of an 
anonymous channel on whistle-blowing intentions. Participants were evening MBA 
students with a mean age of 30 (SD 4.6) and mean work experience of 8.6 years (SD 5.0), 
(n = 90). Participants were randomly assigned to two reporting channel scenarios. One 
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channel offered two non-anonymous reporting options, management and internal audit. 
The other offered these plus an anonymous channel. The three randomly assigned case 
scenarios involved financial reporting fraud, theft of assets, and dishonest and misleading 
remarks made by an outside systems consultant. The third manipulation was the presence 
of a higher quality versus a lower quality internal audit department. Based on prior 
research, Kaplan and Schultz (2007) described the higher (lower) quality internal audit 
department as one that reported to the audit committee (management), had a financial 
(business consulting) orientation, was staffed with more (fewer) certified internal 
auditors, and had a high (adequate) budget funding level. In addition, internal auditors in 
high (low) quality departments were not (were) eligible to receive performance based 
bonuses.  
Kaplan and Schultz (2007) used repeated measure ANOVA to analyze the results. 
The most significant finding was that when participants could choose between non-
anonymous and anonymous channels, the overall intention to blow the whistle, across all 
reporting channels, decreased. In addition, the results showed that the choice to report to 
management versus the internal audit department was not dependent on the quality of the 
internal audit department. A supplemental analysis of participants who had a choice of 
both non-anonymous and anonymous channels revealed that the perceived cost of 
reporting was higher for non-anonymous channels. One limitation of this study is that 
only 29 percent of the MBA participants reported actually observing a wrongdoing 
perpetrated by a person of a higher level of authority in their workplace. Nevertheless, 
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these results bring into question the helpfulness of the SOX mandated anonymous 
whistle-blowing channel. 
A recent study (Dyck et al. 2007) of archival data corroborated Kaplan and 
Schultz’s (2007) findings. The study was sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research and examined 230 actual fraud cases, pre and post-SOX. The fraud sample 
consisted of companies that were defendants in class action suits filed under the 1933 
Exchange Act or the 1934 Securities Act. Thus, the sample source was Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse data. The sample period included alleged frauds 
that ended in 1996 through 2004. The final sample, after screening for four additional 
factors (i.e. company size, US firm, dollar value of settlement, and non standard security 
frauds), was 244 cases. The findings indicated that the whistle-blowing provisions of 
SOX may not be working as intended. One aim of Section 301 of SOX was to encourage 
more employees to report wrongdoing by providing anonymous channels. However, this 
study finds a decrease, from 20.7 percent (pre-SOX) to 15.6 percent (post-SOX), in 
whistle-blowing reports initiated by employees. Moreover, employees whose identities 
were revealed suffered significant negative consequences. Eighty-two percent of these 
individuals were allegedly fired, quit, or had their responsibilities significantly changed 
(Dyck et al. 2007).  
The fourth biennial global economic crime survey published by PWC (2007) 
reported that frauds detected by whistle-blowing hotlines increased from 4 percent of 
fraud cases in 2005 to 8 percent in 2007. For corporations that rated their whistle-blowing 
systems as effective, the hotline statistic rose to 14 percent for 2007.  In addition “internal 
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tip-offs” not received through the hot-line accounted for another 21 percent of fraud cases 
in 2007, up from 17 percent in 2005. These results were somewhat contradictory to Dyck 
et al. (2007); however, all of the PWC data was post-SOX, it included three more recent 
years, and the data sources of the two studies were quite different. In a benchmarking 
study, The Security Executive Council (2007) compiled the overall statistics on the use of 
hotlines. Their report revealed that only 10 percent of incidents reported through hotlines 
from 2003 through 2006 were related to fraud and corruption; most (51 percent) were 
personnel management related.  
Summary 
Anonymous whistle-blowing that was once considered to be ethically justified in 
only a limited number of cases has been increasingly encouraged and protected by 
regulatory bodies. Existing research shows that whistle-blowers, in general, have positive 
individual characteristics, and that the act of whistle-blowing is considered by many to be 
prosocial behavior. These developments indicate that anonymous whistle-blowing should 
have become not only more widely accepted, but also more widely practiced. However, 
anonymous whistle-blowing continues to present both the whistle-blower and the 
complaint recipient with more than one dilemma. Although the cost of anonymous 
whistle-blowing may be lower for the whistle-blower, the possibility of weakened 
efficacy also decreases the benefit. Since anonymous whistle-blowers cannot signal their 
power or credibility, the primary burden of the efficacy of the whistle-blowing action 
falls on the complaint recipient. It follows that the ultimate success of SOX and other 
regulations that promote whistle-blowing, especially the anonymous reporting of 
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wrongdoing, depends on the decisions made and actions taken by the complaint recipient. 
In many organizations, especially publicly traded companies, that complaint recipient is 
the internal audit department, more specifically, the CAE. 
The Role of the Internal Auditor 
 The role of internal auditors in organizations is not prescribed by obligatory 
auditing standards as is the role of external auditors. The Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) defines internal auditing as “an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations…by bringing a 
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes” (IIA 2000). Some internal audit 
departments have focused on the traditional compliance functions that involve testing 
internal controls and financial accounting transactions. In other organizations, the internal 
audit function has been more oriented toward business consulting where the emphasis is 
on adding value through process improvement. The former role, with its compliance 
function focus, requires the internal auditor to maintain a greater level of independence 
from management, while the latter more or less creates a partnership with management 
(Nagy and Cenker 2007). 
 However, since the enactment of SOX, the focus of most internal audit functions 
in public companies is their role in corporate governance. The IIA frequently uses the 
analogy of a four-legged table when describing corporate governance. Internal audit, 
external audit, executive management, and the board of directors are the four legs, each 
serving in a crucial, but separate role (Adamec et al. 2005). 
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Many, if not most, internal audit functions have been enlisted as the primary 
vehicle to oversee the documentation of and compliance with internal controls as required 
by Section 404 of SOX. Krell (2006) noted that this required focus on internal control 
compliance is distracting internal auditors from the more traditional and essential role of 
fraud prevention and detection. According to the PWC (2007) report, internal audit was 
the leading detection method of fraud in both the 2005 and 2007 surveys. Moreover, 95 
percent of companies that had more than five fraud risk management controls had an 
internal audit function. This is compared to only 61 percent of companies that had 
instituted only up to five controls. The group with more controls detected more fraud 
cases; but fewer of the companies in this group suffered significant collateral damage due 
to fraud.  
 Clearly, internal auditors have played a critical role in fraud deterrence and 
detection. However, in the current environment, regulators, audit committee members, 
external auditors, and executive management are all focused on internal audit’s 
contribution to compliance with SOX 404 (Krell 2006). These constituents rely on the 
assistance of internal audit in various ways. The competing demands of these groups can 
create ethical dilemmas as internal auditors attempt to carry out their responsibilities as 
compliance officers and fraud deterrers. 
Internal Auditor Relationships 
The External Auditor’s Reliance on the Internal Audit Function 
 External auditors have traditionally played a major role in corporate governance 
by performing the financial statement audit and issuing the audit opinion. It has been 
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routine for internal audit departments to assist by conducting tests under the external 
auditor’s supervision. Now, under Section 404 of SOX, external auditors not only attest 
to the fairness of the financial statements, but also to management’s assertions as to the 
adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting. Accordingly, external auditors 
must conduct their own audit of the organization’s internal controls. Because of the 
enormous time commitment, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board allows 
external auditors to rely on internal audit testing. To do so, the external auditor must 
determine that the internal auditors possess appropriate levels of competence and 
independence (Adamec et al. 2005). 
 Although internal auditors play a critical role in external auditors’ assessments of 
internal controls over financial reporting, there are some indications that the relationship 
between the two has deteriorated in the post-SOX environment. Nagy and Cenker (2007) 
conducted personal interviews with CAEs from 17 publicly listed companies located in 
Northeast Ohio in February and March of 2006. These CAEs had substantial internal 
audit experience (mean = 17.5 years) and tenure in their current positions (mean = 5.7 
years). Although the sample is targeted and small, the findings provide some useful 
insights. Twelve of the CAEs indicated that the independence provisions of SOX had put 
a strain on their relationships with external auditors. Nine of these CAEs stated that they 
no longer sought advice from external auditors on complex issues in fear that the issue 
would be written up as a significant deficiency in internal control. Several CAEs offered 
that the tremendous responsibility and workload placed on the external auditors by SOX 
was a significant cause of the deterioration in relationships (Nagy and Cenker 2007). 
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Regardless of the cordiality of the relationship between an organization’s internal and 
external auditors, it remains that external auditors rely heavily on the internal audit 
function.  
Executive Management and the Internal Auditor 
 Although executive management is shown as an equal leg in the corporate 
governance table, most corporate governance responsibilities rest on its shoulders. SOX 
Section 404 requires management to document and evaluate the design and operation of 
internal controls over financial reporting. Internal auditors support executive management 
in these tasks. The IIA position paper on internal auditing’s role in SOX compliance 
warned that internal auditors should not become involved to the extent of interfering with 
their ability to remain independent and objective. In practice, the writers admitted, this 
balance has been hard to achieve (IIA 2004). 
Even before the danger of becoming enmeshed with management’s SOX Section 
404 responsibilities, internal auditors have historically faced challenges with reporting to 
executive management and being part of the management team while simultaneously 
maintaining the independence and objectivity necessary to carry out their responsibilities. 
Traditionally, CAEs have reported to executive management, usually the CFO or CEO. 
The IIA recommends a functional reporting relationship to the audit committee and an 
administrative reporting relationship to executive management; indeed, there has been a 
post-SOX shift toward these reporting lines. The Global Summary of the Common Body 
of Knowledge published by the Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF 2006) 
reports that audit committees are involved in appointing CAEs in 68 percent of 
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companies in North America, and are involved in evaluating the CAE’s performance in 
59.8 percent. Nevertheless, executive management has sole positional authority over 
CAEs in a large percentage of organizations and continues to have a significant influence 
over CAEs’ careers in almost all organizations.  
Internal auditors generally enjoy positive relationships with and the support of 
executive management. However, conflict in relationships is a natural occurrence in all 
organizational settings. The challenge is for the CAE to maintain independence without 
becoming isolated from executive management. The current shift toward the audit 
committee’s reliance on the CAE may make this challenge even more daunting. Audit 
committee members must now be independent directors. Although this gives them greater 
autonomy to oversee corporate governance, it also creates a knowledge gap between 
committee members and executive management. The CAE has become a key player in 
reducing this information asymmetry. It is understandable that even ethical and effective 
members of executive management may be wary, in some respects, of this role for the 
CAE. 
Should the CAE disagree with a member of executive management in a matter of 
consequence, the CAE must decide on the appropriate professional response. A survey of 
directors of internal audit revealed that more than one half of the respondents felt that 
audit committee power was not sufficient to adequately protect an internal auditor from 
management retaliation (Tidrick 1992). Post-SOX audit committees may have more 
authority and may, therefore, provide more protection. However, the choice to remain 
part of an executive management team in an adversarial role is complex and difficult. 
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One seasoned audit committee chairman remarked that a CAE must have courage, 
extraordinary political skills, and endurance to exist within the corporate world while 
maintaining responsibility to the board and audit committee. He sums up his idea of 
courage by exclaiming, “And if you are not willing to put your job on the line, then you 
shouldn’t take the job” (Allison 1994, 51). Obviously this audit committee chair expects 
the CAE’s loyalty to professional ethics and overall corporate governance to trump his 
loyalty to management.  
The Audit Committee’s Reliance on the Internal Audit Function 
Even prior to SOX, audit committees have been charged with increasing levels of 
responsibility for corporate governance. A common theme in the recommendations of the 
Treadway Commission (1987), the Blue Ribbon Committee (hereafter, BRC, 1999), and 
SOX is that audit committees should assume greater responsibility with respect to 
corporate governance by focusing on financial reporting and internal control. These 
initiatives emphasize audit committee interaction with internal auditors in varying 
degrees.  
In its report on fraudulent financial reporting, the Treadway Commission (1987) 
addressed the internal audit function’s role in detecting such fraudulent reporting 
indirectly. The Commission’s report states that the internal auditor's qualifications, status 
and reporting relationships must be adequate to ensure the internal audit function's 
effectiveness and objectivity. Internal audit did play a role in implementing the 
Commission’s more specific recommendations. For example, the Commission urged 
companies to adopt and enforce a written code of conduct. This recommendation was 
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based on the assumption that an ethical tone at the top would help prevent fraudulent 
reporting. A post-Treadway study (Peacock and Pelfrey 1991) examined internal auditors 
and codes of conduct. The study analyzed responses from internal auditors in 795 
organizations, 503 of which were publicly traded companies. Eighty-seven percent of 
respondents that were in publicly held companies stated that their companies had a code 
of conduct. Moreover, internal auditors were responsible for reviewing the code of 
conduct in 67 percent of these companies, and for testing compliance in 53 percent. 
Peacock and Pelfrey (1991) also found that only 60 percent of internal auditors reported 
having access to the organization’s audit committee. They predicted that internal audit’s 
role and access to audit committees would continue to increase as audit committees 
adopted the Treadway Commission’s recommendation to report on management’s 
compliance with the code of conduct. 
Although the BRC encouraged direct communication channels between the audit 
committee and internal audit, it did not go so far as to make explicit recommendations 
with respect to audit committee contacts with internal audit. A post-BRC study that 
surveyed 296 CAEs reported that audit committees’ responses to the eight effectiveness 
steps suggested by the BRC were, overall, quite positive. Specifically, with respect to 
internal audit interaction, audit committees with higher levels of effort to improve their 
effectiveness communicated more with CAEs than those with lower levels of effort. 
Moreover, more frequent communication between the CAE and the audit committee was 
linked with higher levels of effort than was a functional reporting relationship between 
the CAE and the audit committee (Myers and Ziegenfuss 2006). 
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Another study (Raghunandan et al. 2001) that also examined a post-BRC time 
period reported that audit committees with independent members and financial experts 
(considered to be the most effective audit committee composition) were most likely to 
meet more frequently with CAEs, spend more time with them at each meeting, and meet 
with CAEs without senior management in attendance than were committees with less 
effective compositions. These studies showed that more effective audit committees place 
a greater value on the assistance of and input from the CAE. 
Communication between internal audit and the audit committee became 
increasingly important as companies adopted the guidelines of the Treadway 
Commission, the BRC, and similar initiatives. However, internal audit functions, overall, 
were experiencing downsizing and outsourcing during these periods. In addition, their 
focus was often on operational issues instead of financial reporting controls (Gray 2004). 
The sweeping changes in corporate governance and focus on financial reporting and 
internal controls mandated by SOX have precipitated resurgence in the perceived value of 
the internal audit function and the CAE. Furthermore, internal audit’s role is shifting back 
to a financial emphasis.   
In a 2002 survey of internal auditors in publicly traded companies, 67 percent of 
respondents reported enhanced support of audit committees by internal audit as 
committees struggled to comply with SOX (IIARF 2004). To meet increased demands to 
support the audit committee and overall SOX requirements, internal audit departments 
are adding more staff from external and internal sources and paying more competitive 
salaries. Senior managers are requesting more internal audit projects and they are less 
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interested in outsourcing the internal audit function. The desired internal auditor skill set 
is now more focused on GAAP and internal controls rather than on operational and 
consulting skills. There is now more often a functional relationship (solid line) between 
the CAE and the audit committee and an administrative relationship (dotted line) between 
the CAE and the CFO or CEO (Gray 2004). Clearly the internal audit function and, more 
specifically, the CAE, is a crucial resource for the audit committee in its quest to properly 
oversee financial reporting and internal controls. 
The Role of Internal Audit in the Whistle-Blowing Process 
After the passage of SOX, audit committees were compelled to carry out the 
responsibilities charged to them in Section 301 (4). Over 67 percent of audit committees 
participating in the 2002 IIA survey (IIARF 2004) reported that, for the first time, they 
were reviewing whistle-blowing allegations and actions taken. Moreover, 33 percent 
attended to whistle-blowing reports at every meeting and 73.6 percent of committees 
reviewed allegations at least annually. Although the audit committee is charged by SOX 
with establishing and overseeing the anonymous whistle-blowing channel, committees 
frequently turn to the internal audit function to provide the ongoing effort to monitor 
whistle-blowing allegations.  
Many companies have chosen to outsource the channel by hiring a reporting 
service to receive hotline calls from employees. Peterson (2006) suggested that the ideal 
situation is for one individual to be assigned as the single point of contact for the 
anonymous reporting service provider. She stated that this single point of contact is often 
the head of internal audit. Daher (2005) emphasized that the CAE is the organization’s 
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best choice as to who will receive whistle-blowing hotline complaints because the CAE 
has direct line to the audit committee and is least likely to be personally involved in 
financial fraud. A recent study by Kaplan and Schultz (2006) corroborated Peterson’s 
observation. Seventy-three percent of the surveyed CAEs indicated that one department 
in their organization had sole responsibility for documenting, investigating, and resolving 
whistle-blowing reports. Internal audit was most often charged with this responsibility. 
Further, CAEs were assigned the responsibility of following up on allegations from 
anonymous whistle-blowers in the majority (71 percent) of the sampled companies.  
Moberly (2006) submitted that the SOX mandated reporting channels should 
encourage more whistle-blowing because it provides incentives for employees to increase 
their role in corporate monitoring while simultaneously reducing previous disincentives. 
In addition, he predicted that the direct channel to the board would encourage effective 
whistle-blowing by minimizing the principal-agent problem that previously existed when 
reports of misconduct went to mid-level managers or corporate executives. If, however, 
the CAE has a key responsibility for receiving and investigating whistle-blowing 
allegations, the principal-agent issue may not be totally resolved. Clearly, the 
effectiveness of the whistle-blowing mechanism may depend on the ability of CAEs to 
perform this function with integrity and objectivity. Given the CAE’s multiple roles and 
complex relationships within the organization, the ability to make effective decisions 
with regard to whistle-blowing reports is not completely certain. 
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Judgment and Decision Making 
 Judgment is the process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and 
comparing. More specifically, in an accounting context, a judgment usually refers to a 
prediction about a future event or state of affairs or an evaluation of a current, but not 
completely revealed event or state of affairs. Consequently, judgments in accounting tend 
to be judgments under circumstances of uncertainty. Decisions require the individual to 
reach a conclusion about the issue at hand and taking a course of action. “Decisions 
typically follow judgments and involve a choice among various alternatives based on 
judgments about those alternatives and preferences for factors such as risk and money. In 
other words, judgments reflect beliefs whereas decisions reflect both beliefs and 
preferences” (Bonner 2008, 2).  
The Role of Ethics in Judgment and Decision Making 
 Ethics in organizations has received an ever increasing societal focus. The 
scandals that precipitated the SOX legislation are but a few in a long line of historical 
misdeeds of individuals in powerful, influential positions. Accordingly, the study of 
ethics in judgment and decision making has expanded over the years. Jones (1991)  
defined an ethical decision “as a decision that is both legal and morally acceptable to the 
larger community” (367). In an analysis of extant models of ethical decision making, he 
pointed out that none considered the characteristics of the moral issue at hand. 
Consequently, Jones (1991) synthesized five models of ethical decision making and 
added the component of moral intensity. The basis of this approach is the understanding 
that people respond differently to moral issues depending on the characteristics of the 
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issue itself. Jones (1991) argued that six characteristics of a moral issue define its 
intensity: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal 
immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect. Jones (1991) proposed that moral 
intensity influences all four stages (recognize moral issue, make moral judgment, 
establish moral intent, and engage in moral behavior) of ethical decision making in 
organizations. Furthermore, he included the organizational factors of group dynamics, 
authority factors, and socialization processes as moderators of the latter two stages.  
 Organizational factors, in particular, create challenges to moral actors and can 
create both biases in and impediments to ethical decision making. In some situations, 
individuals may not see themselves as totally independent moral actors; they cede 
responsibility for decisions to the authority structure of the organization (Jones 1991). It 
follows that the ethical climate of an organization’s authority structure can be of 
paramount significance in influencing decisions of organization members. The Treadway 
Commission (1987) report directed public companies to develop and enforce written 
codes of conduct and the COSO (1992) report on internal control regarded the ethical 
tone of the organization as the foundation for all other components of internal control. 
Both these reports emphasized an ethical corporate environment. These are just two 
examples of the recognition by regulators and professional groups of the importance of 
top management’s attitude toward integrity and ethical values.  
The Internal Auditor’s Code of Ethics 
 In addition to the ethical climate of their employer organization, most 
professionals have separate codes of ethics that guide them in decision making. The 
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Institute of Internal Auditors’ Code of Ethics (IIA 2000) states that internal auditors are 
expected to uphold the principles of integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and 
competency. The related Code of Conduct describes specific attitudes and behaviors that 
are expected of internal auditors in carrying out their duties and adhering to the Code of 
Ethics (IIA 2000). Likewise, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) requires members to adhere to ethical standards. It is not uncommon for internal 
auditors to belong to both professional groups. The AICPA (1992)  focus is on 
independence, integrity, and objectivity. The AICPA standards acknowledge that the 
question of independence is assumed to automatically impair by virtue of an employment 
arrangement and consequently, places an even higher emphasis on objectivity for 
members employed in industry. 
 A study that explored the influence of the IIA Code of Ethics on members found 
that the Code did have a positive influence on members’ ethical perceptions and was 
useful in resolving ethical dilemmas. Ziegenfuss and Singhapadki (1994) designed a 
survey instrument to assess IIA members’ ethical positions, as measured by the EPQ, and 
their opinions about the importance of each of the 11 standards of the IIA Code of Ethics. 
These authors ascertained participants’ ethical perceptions by measuring responses to 
three scenarios involving ethical dilemmas and found that the scores on IIA norms were 
significantly and positively related to ethical perceptions in all three case scenarios. 
However, individuals’ personal ethical philosophies as measured by the EPQ and their 
professional certifications did not have a statistically significant relationship with ethical 
perception.  
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Ethics, Judgment, and Decision Making in Whistle-Blowing Scenarios 
 Elliston (1982) claimed that, with respect to whistle-blowing, responsibility has 
two dimensions. Descriptive responsibility refers to the person that causes something to 
happen, whereas normative responsibility identifies those who should do something 
about it. “The first sense looks to the past, as part of an explanation. The second looks to 
the future as a coping strategy” (169). Elliston was referring to the whistle-blower in his 
definition of the normative dimension, likewise, this could easily be extended to the 
recipient of the whistle-blowing complaint.  
Although some individuals, such as internal auditors, may be what Miceli and 
Near (1992) referred to as role-prescribed whistle-blowers, there are reasons why role-
prescribed whistle-blowers may face countervailing pressures that would serve to 
discourage whistle-blowing or the further investigation of a whistle-blowing report. First, 
as Dozier and Miceli (1985) point out, written directives do not necessarily reflect actual 
formal and informal reward contingencies. If executive management is involved in the 
alleged wrongdoing, clearly there are incentives for an internal auditor to ignore or 
downplay the report. In addition, Miceli and Near (1992) suggested that role-prescribed 
whistle-blowers believe they have the option of ignoring wrongdoing or exposing it. 
While this attitude is inconsistent with the IIA Code of Ethics, it does highlight the fact 
that there is a decision process for both role-prescribed whistle-blowers as well as those 
without such role prescriptions. Surely one’s personal and professional ethical standing is 
an important factor in the decision to follow through with either whistle-blowing or 
investigating another’s whistle-blowing report. 
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One study examined the influences of moral reasoning on internal auditors’ 
judgments concerning the receipt of whistle-blowing reports. Arnold and Ponemon 
(1991) designed a between-subjects experiment using 106 internal auditors as 
participants. Participants were asked to predict whether an individual in one of six 
different case study scenarios would or would not blow the whistle. The first 
manipulation was the position of the prospective whistle-blower: internal auditor, 
external auditor, or marketing analyst. The second manipulation was the probable 
consequence of reporting (retaliation): the whistle-blower’s friends may lose their jobs 
(affiliation) or whistle-blower may lose her job (penalty). The participants also completed 
the Defining Issues Test (DIT), an instrument that measures levels of moral reasoning.  
 A three-way ANOVA revealed that all three main effects (DIT score, position, 
and retaliation) were significant as were the interactions. Overall, findings indicated that 
internal auditors with higher levels of moral reasoning, as measured by the DIT, were 
more likely to predict that the subject in the case study would blow the whistle. Arnold 
and Ponemon (1991) also found that internal auditors predicted that external auditors 
were most likely to blow the whistle, followed by internal auditors, and that marketing 
analysts were least likely to report. Consequently, these findings suggest that ethical 
internal auditors would expect others to blow the whistle and, furthermore, that they 
might assume that the whistle-blowing individual is in a more objective professional 
position. It follows that ethical internal auditors would presumably judge such whistle-
blowing reports to be credible and deserving of investigation.  
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Biased Predecision Processing 
In forming a judgment about a specific event or state of affairs and making 
subsequent decisions, individuals go through the process of evaluating the situation and 
accessing pertinent existing beliefs. The decision they make incorporates not only their 
intentional evaluations and comparisons of beliefs, but also includes subconscious beliefs 
and motives. Although internal auditors are charged with exhibiting the highest level of 
professional objectivity and with making judgments based on unbiased evaluations of all 
the relevant circumstances (IIA 2000), CAEs face ethical dilemmas just like other 
corporate executives. Internal auditors are employees of the organizations they audit; 
accordingly, they face concerns over retaliation for and personal costs of their decisions 
and actions. Even those CAEs who report functionally to the audit committee must face 
the reality that they still serve the CEO. They may encounter the consequences of 
reputation threat and career penalties if a decision or action is viewed as unfavorable by 
executive management. Therefore, CAEs may be subject to unconscious biases in 
judgment and decision making. 
Existing research in biased cognitive processing tended to support one of two 
views. Theorists support either a motivational position that cognitions are biased to meet 
an individual’s desires, or the position that cognitive biases are the result of rational 
inferential processes. Pyszcynski and Greenberg (1987) show how the two views can be 
integrated by explaining biased hypothesis testing. For example, when an unexpected 
event occurs, an individual will select several hypotheses for testing that are perceived to 
provide plausible explanations. The individual then generates an inference rule to test 
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each selected hypothesis, searches for and appraises information, and finally evaluates 
the hypothesis for acceptance or rejection. While this may be a rational cognitive process 
with an apparent motive of accuracy, other motives can influence some or all of the 
stages. The need to protect self-esteem, maintain consistency in beliefs, maintain control, 
and others may be primary drivers. These motivations can influence the entire process 
beginning with how one determines which hypotheses are plausible explanations for the 
unexpected event (Pyszcynski and Greenberg 1987). 
Brownstein (2003) explained that “biased predecision processing occurs when 
decision makers restructure their mental representations of the decision environment to 
favor one alternative before making a choice” (545). This restructuring of mental 
representations is most often on a subconscious level. Needs and motives often influence 
mental processes in a way that enables the decision maker to maintain an illusion of 
objectivity (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987). Brownstein (2003) categorized motivated 
reasoning as a form of predecision processing bias. 
Motivated Reasoning 
 Kunda’s (1990) definition of the process of reasoning encompassed both 
judgment and decision making. Motivated reasoning takes place when the decision maker 
uses biased cognitive processes as strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating 
beliefs. These phenomena represent two major categories. The first is the motivation to 
reach an accurate conclusion and the second is to reach a particular directional 
conclusion. 
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Accuracy Goals 
Individuals are most likely to strive for accuracy when they expect to justify their 
decision, expect the decision to be made public, or expect to be evaluated in some other 
way. If they are evaluating another person, concern over how their decision will affect the 
evaluated person may also lead to an accuracy goal. Individuals with accuracy goals tend 
to have lower levels of bias in cognitive processing (Kunda 1990). Though accuracy 
goals do not always eliminate bias, overall, individuals striving to be accurate are likely 
to use more complex and deeper processing of information, as well as rules and strategies 
that are more appropriate for the situation (Kunda 1990).  
Nevertheless, accuracy goals do not always lead to more accurate judgments and 
decisions. Kruglanski (1989) explained that individuals rely on repertories of inferential 
rules that they have derived from both self-schema and their conceptions of external 
sources of information. A person’s available rules may help or hinder accurate decision 
making. Adopting an expert’s opinion as one’s own, an example of a source heuristic, 
may lead to a less accurate decision if the source’s judgment is not applicable to the 
situation (Kruglanski 1989). Moreover, some biases have been shown to be resistant to 
accuracy manipulations. These include the use of the availability heuristic (basing a 
prediction or concept of the characteristics of the whole population on an available 
example that comes easily to mind) and failure to acknowledge the law of large numbers. 
An individual with an accuracy goal that wrongly applies such a heuristic or statistical 
property may exacerbate biased reasoning (Kunda 1990).  
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 The term accuracy brings to mind an evaluation of correctness; however, Tyszka 
(1998) gave accuracy an alternative definition. He defined an accuracy goal as the 
decision maker’s concern about regret for the decision made if afterward it should turn 
out to be wrong. Overall, accuracy goals focus on the completeness and reliability of the 
evaluation process. Tyszka (1998) contrasted the completeness of evaluation of an 
accuracy goal with the goal to minimize effort and consider as few features of the choice 
alternatives as possible. Another conflict that competes with the reliability of the 
accuracy goal is the desire for distinctness. Instead of reliability, an individual may be 
focused on trying to maximize the differences between the attractive features of her 
choice and the features of alternative choices. Tyszka (1998) purported that the relative 
strength of these two opposing motivational systems will together determine the extent of 
biased predecision processing in a given judgment and decision making scenario. 
Directional Goals 
 Directional goals reflect the desire or need for specific conclusions or outcomes. 
They affect reasoning by influencing which information will be considered in the 
judgment and decision making process (Kunda 1990). Directional goals influence the 
reasoning process in a variety of ways. The mechanisms include biased accessing of 
beliefs about oneself, biased accessing of beliefs about others, biased selection of 
statistical heuristics, and biased processing of information. 
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Biased Beliefs about Self 
 Directional goals may bias an individual’s interpretations of his attitudes, beliefs, 
personal traits, and preferences. For example, participants in an experiment that were 
encouraged to believe that extroversion or introversion was conducive to academic 
success tended to view themselves as possessing higher levels of that trait than other 
participants. These findings indicated that the participants were motivated to think of 
themselves as possessing success-promoting attributes. The manipulations successfully 
influenced self-perceptions; however, the participants’ prior self-knowledge also played a 
role. For example, those who believed they were extroverts and were encouraged to 
believe that introverts were more academically successful did not change their self-
concept to introversion, but to a lower level of extroversion (Kunda and Sanitioso 1989). 
Biased Beliefs about Others 
Biased beliefs about others have been most often investigated through outcome 
dependency where individuals expect their own outcomes to depend in some way on 
another person. Klein and Kunda (1992) designed two separate studies to explore how 
people construct justifications for desired beliefs about others. They examined how 
different motivations incented people to form different general beliefs so that they could 
logically project the desired beliefs on a target individual. In the first study, participants 
with different goals (the target would be a partner in a competition or the target would be 
a competitor) concluded different target abilities in spite of the fact that targets exhibited 
identical behavior. The researchers concluded that the motivation to hold a specific 
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opinion of a target person may affect one’s beliefs about the ability of the target’s peer 
group. Similarly, one’s general beliefs or stereotypes of an entire group may be biased so 
as to justify desired beliefs about the one group member (Klein and Kunda 1992). The 
second study was designed to examine bias in the opposite direction. The desired belief 
about an individual would precipitate changes in one’s general beliefs about the entire 
group of that individual’s peers. The findings supported the researchers’ predictions. 
Participants expecting to interact with a member of a stigmatized group came to hold a 
more positive stereotype of the entire group (Klein and Kunda 1992). 
Biased Use of Statistical Heuristics 
 Several studies have investigated the biased accessing of statistical heuristics. One 
study employed a variant of the law of large numbers, the aggregation principle. The 
aggregation principle holds that increasing the number in the sample of observed events 
increases the predictability of that class of events. Sanitioso and Kunda (1991) 
hypothesized that in determining the amount of evidence to gather people may use such a 
heuristic to justify their predecisions regarding the amount of evidence they want to 
gather, which, in turn, could depend on the ease or difficulty of evidence collection. If 
obtaining evidence is costly, an individual may choose to gather less evidence and, 
consequently, place a lower value on the informative nature of further evidence. The 
actual results of Sanitioso and Kunda’s (1991) two studies were somewhat 
counterintuitive, but consistent, in that participants in the higher evidence cost scenario 
appeared to appropriate the aggregation principle more often than those in the scenario 
with a lower evidence cost. These researchers claimed that the desire to be reasonably 
 
     
 
  54
 
accurate (and thus win more money in the study) influenced the gathering of more 
evidence. Nevertheless, the costliness of the evidence made participants reluctant to 
observe larger samples. The researchers’ overall conclusion was that people are 
committed to seemingly rational inferential processes in which they try to build a 
reasoned justification for their preferred conclusions. However, in doing so, they are 
unaware of the motivated biases in their reasoning processes. 
 Other studies examined base-rate neglect. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) defined 
this to be a situation where the exact or approximate base-rate is known by an individual, 
but she ignores the information or significantly underweights it. In one of these studies, 
participants were given case data about a person and then asked to assign (rank) a set of 
outcomes by different criteria. One group of participants was instructed to categorize the 
person into a profession (an outcome group) based on the degree to which the person’s 
description was representative of the stereotype characteristics of the members of that 
profession. Another participant group was instructed to rank the same outcomes 
(professions) based on the probability that they applied to the person in question. A third 
group of participants was not given individual descriptions. The rankings of the first two 
groups were nearly identical and both ignored the base-rate information provided. The 
third group, lacking personality sketches, relied on the base-rate information to assign a 
probability of the subject’s ranking. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) concluded that the 
ranking decisions of the first two groups were based on representativeness of the 
subject’s personality sketch and not the more accurate base-rate information. 
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 One tenant of decision theory is that the probability of an outcome is independent 
of that outcome’s value or importance (Levy and Hershey 2006). Value-induced bias 
violates a principle of decision theory by allowing the nature of an outcome to influence 
the judgment of how likely it is to occur. The manipulations in Levy and Hershey’s  
(2006) study involved participants reading various case scenarios that told them (to 
imagine) that they had been diagnosed with a disease. The flow of information about 
what form of the disease an individual participant had was varied along with solicited 
feedback as to his desire for treatment, his predicted probability of the treatment’s 
success, and his certainty of the probability. Participants weighed a painful two week 
treatment with an undetermined probability of individual success (there was a 40 percent 
success rate overall for treatment) against the alternative of suffering with the disease for 
two months with no treatment. As the researchers predicted, participants who were asked 
about their desire for treatment early on in the experiment adjusted the probability of 
treatment success to justify their pre-stated desire, even when they knew that the overall 
probability of success was 40 percent. That is, those who wanted treatment supposed the 
probability of success to be higher and those who did not want treatment supposed the 
probability of treatment success to be lower (Levy and Hershey 2006). 
Biased Information Processing 
Pyszczynski et al. (1985) designed an experimental study to investigate self-
serving bias in the evaluation of new information. Participants took a standard social 
sensitivity survey and then (without their knowledge) were assigned random scores by 
the researchers. Participants were then asked to evaluate two separate research reports 
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that critiqued the survey instrument. One report found the instrument to have high 
validity and the other report concluded low validity. Participants who were randomly 
assigned the higher test scores rated the study that supported the validity of the survey 
instrument more positively than those who were assigned lower scores. Similarly, the 
high scoring participants found the low validity study to be less convincing. Lower 
scoring participants responded in the opposite manner. Pyszczynski et al. (1985) 
concluded that individuals judge information that is consistent with a self-serving bias to 
have higher validity than information that is not consistent with that bias. Furthermore, 
this distorted evaluation of information allows individuals to generate and maintain such 
self-serving beliefs without forsaking the need to have logical consistency between their 
conclusions and the evidence at hand. 
Russo et al. (1996) sought to test their prediction that an established preference 
for one of the choices in a preferential choice task might lead to a biased evaluation of 
new information about the alternatives. Their findings supported this prediction and 
suggested that in addition to a current belief or a preferred conclusion, preference for one 
of the options is also a source of confirmation bias. In an attempt to explain the possible 
reasons for this finding, Russo et al. (1996) addressed two possible psychological 
mechanisms: the desire to maintain consistency and the desire to reduce effort. 
Consistency may take the form of ego defense, which is a desire to support prior 
conclusions. Alternatively, individuals may distort new information so that it is congruent 
with existing information in an attempt to support their desire for a consistent and orderly 
world. Participants may also distort new information to accelerate their cumulative 
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preference for a specific choice in order to finish the evaluation task sooner. On the other 
hand, they may distort new information to more easily integrate it with existing 
information and exert less effort to process it (Russo et al. 1996). 
Boiney et al. (1997) conducted a two-part study to investigate extensions to the 
motivated reasoning literature. The 65 undergraduate participants in the first study 
assumed the role of a marketing manager and were asked to make sales forecasts for two 
new products based on best estimates of industry experts. The treatment group was 
motivated to make higher forecasts and the control group was given neutral information. 
For each product there was one discrepant expert forecast. It was two standard deviations 
above the mean for one product and four standard deviations above the mean for the 
other. Participants could choose to rely on the discrepant estimate to form their forecast, 
although they would have to weigh this against the justification that they relied heavily 
on outlier information. The study results suggest that decision makers who are motivated 
to support a particular conclusion will adopt decision strategies most likely to yield the 
desired conclusion. However, the motivated subjects recommended a goal directed 
decision less frequently when the industry expert estimates contained greater 
discrepancies. Consequently, the researchers concluded that a decision maker’s ability to 
justify the reasonableness of both the process and the conclusion constrains the tendency 
to adopt a biased processing strategy.  
In their second study, Boiney et al. (1997) examined how motivated decision 
makers manage the tension between the two potentially conflicting objectives of adopting 
a decision making process that supports the goal directed conclusion versus one that can 
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be justified as reasonable. Like the first, this experimental task was related to sales 
forecasting. The 122 undergraduate student participants assumed the same role as those 
in the first study and, similarly, were asked to develop sales forecasts based on industry 
expert estimates. The discrepancies in the expert estimates were held constant. Instead, 
the motivation to support the goal directed decision was manipulated. Participants 
motivated to give the highest sales forecasts attached the greatest weight to the most 
discrepant high industry expert estimate. In contrast, the majority of decision makers who 
did not need to justify their decision by relying heavily on the discrepant estimate chose 
not to do so. Boiney et al. (1997) concluded that the motivational bias appeared to be 
instrumental; that is, it increased when greater bias was needed to support a desired 
result. Thus, these researchers expanded the application of Kunda’s (1990) theory to a 
quantitative business decision process. 
Quantity of Processing  
While some of the previously reviewed studies (e.g. Kunda 1990, Pyszczynski 
and Greenberg 1987) supported the view that individuals differ in the way and the degree 
to which they process preference-consistent versus preference-inconsistent information, 
other research suggested the alternative quantity of processing view (e.g. Ditto and Lopez 
1992; Ditto et al. 1998; Jain and Maheswaran 2000). Ditto and Lopez (1992) proposed 
that information that is consistent with a preferred conclusion is examined less critically 
than is information that is inconsistent with the preferred conclusion. Furthermore, they 
advocated that less information is then required to reach a preference-consistent 
conclusion than a preference-inconsistent conclusion. To test this hypothesis, they 
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designed studies in two different domains in which they held the judgment constant 
(either preference-consistent or preference-inconsistent) and measured the amount of 
information that participants required to make that judgment. The results support the 
hypothesis that participants will use differential decision criteria for the preferred versus 
the non-preferred conclusions. Ditto and Lopez (1996) made it clear that they were not 
implying the source of bias, only that there was a quantity difference in the processing of 
the information. Accordingly, they suggest that the quantitative view of self-serving bias 
may underlie both accuracy and directional motivational goals. Judgments are most often 
motivated by more than one goal, the desire for an accurate view of the world as well as 
the desire for a particular view of the world.  
Following Ditto and Lopez (1996), Jain and Maheswaran (2000) used the 
sufficiency principle to explain the psychological mechanism that underlies the quantity 
of processing view. An individual in a given decision making scenario has an actual 
confidence level which represents her subjective experience. Each individual also has a 
desired confidence level which she wishes to attain before making the decision. Jain and 
Maheswaran (2000) submitted that the gap between the two confidence levels is the 
underlying motivator of processing effort. In other words, an individual will process 
available information until it is sufficient to bridge the confidence gap. Preference-
inconsistent information may serve to raise the desired confidence level or, conversely, it 
may lower the actual confidence level. In either case, preference-inconsistent information 
generates a wider confidence gap and, thus, generates more effort. Their study findings 
supported the sufficiency principle as an explanation for greater scrutiny of preference-
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inconsistent information. The results indicated that preference-inconsistent information 
generated more effort by lowering participants’ actual confidence levels. The desired 
confidence levels remained similar for both preference-inconsistent information and 
preference-consistent information (Jain and Maheswaran 2000). 
The overall conclusion of motivated reasoning theorists is that whether accuracy 
goals or directional goals are the primary drivers, people do attempt to be rational. People 
are not free to believe anything they wish to believe. On the other hand, beliefs are 
influenced by both wishes and fears. “Both passion and reason are characteristic of 
human thought. The research presented here continues this process of recognizing this 
duality and conceptualizing the passionate side of human judgment within the more 
general information processing framework from which it was once banished”  (Ditto and 
Lopez 1996, 582). 
Predecision Bias in Accounting Studies 
Although Boiney et al. (1997) extended motivated reasoning to a business related 
decision setting additional studies addressed predecision bias and justification in more 
specific accounting related settings. In one of the earlier studies, Farmer et al. (1987) 
examined the influence of potential client loss and potential threat of lawsuits on the 
decisions of auditors at differing ranks. Their participants were 75 practicing auditors (19 
staff, 26 seniors, 19 managers, and 11 partners) from seven of the Big Eight firms along 
with 29 senior level accounting students in an auditing course. First, Farmer et al. (1987) 
compared and contrasted the participant groups’ rankings of attributes of auditor 
independence. They found that students and lower level auditors, those not fully 
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acculturated in the firm, ranked economic independence as significantly more important 
than did managers and partners. Overall, the staff accountants agreed with the client’s 
position more often than managers and partners.  
In the specific conditions of high risk of client loss, staff accountants championed 
the client’s position 27 percent of the time in contrast to managers and partners agreeing 
with the client position only 19 percent of the time. Reponses to the same client position 
scenarios by staff level participants in low threat conditions showed that these results are 
not merely due to the inexperience of staff level auditors. Both the staff level group and 
the manager/partner groups favored the client position significantly more often when the 
risk of client loss was high compared to when it was low.  
Although Farmer et al. (1987) do not discuss any theoretical basis for their results, 
it is clear that they discovered incongruence between stated beliefs and actual decisions. 
Moreover, their study highlights decision bias in the presence of two types of threats. The 
design of this experiment did not allow valid conclusions as to whether the decision bias 
was a cognitive process or the unintentional result of motivated reasoning.  
Hackenback and Nelson (1996) designed an experiment to investigate whether 
auditors use the flexibility provided by vague disclosure criteria in actual accounting 
standards to justify reporting methods. Participants were 90 auditors from one Big Six 
firm with mean experience of 3.28 years. The two manipulations were engagement risk 
level and applicable accounting standard. The company in the high risk condition was a 
first year client that was considering an IPO and that was in danger of violating a debt 
covenant agreement. The company in the moderate risk condition was a continuing client 
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that was not being threatened with debt covenant issues and there was no mention of an 
IPO. The accounting standard manipulation concerned SFAS No. 5 addressing the 
allowance for doubtful accounts, versus SFAS No. 77 addressing the recognition of the 
transfer of receivables as a sale or a loan. Management made aggressive disclosures in 
both accounting standard conditions.  
As hypothesized, Hackenback and Nelson (1996) found that when engagement 
risk is low or medium, auditors were more likely to permit an aggressive reporting 
position. On the contrary, auditors in the high engagement risk condition were more 
likely to select the more conservative position. Furthermore, auditors in the study applied 
the vague language in the specific accounting standards in a manner consistent with the 
reporting position they selected. Instead of recommending that accounting standards be 
changed to allow less latitude in application, these researchers emphasized that 
diminishing aggressive reporting may require sufficient incentives to auditors to enforce 
the more conservative applications of existing standards. 
 Following Hackenback and Nelson (1996), Russo et al. (2000) compared the 
predecisional distortion of information by auditors to that of salespersons. They designed 
an experiment to examine the presence of distortion in professionals making familiar 
professional decisions and to determine whether accountability would serve to reduce 
distortion. Auditor participants were 90 employees of KPMG with median work 
experience of four years. Salesperson participants were 76 employees of a large 
pharmaceutical company with median work experience of five years. Each group made 
two professional decisions; one judgment task was pertinent to their specific profession 
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and one was the same for both groups (choosing a restaurant for a business dinner). Some 
participants also completed a third non-professional task so that they could be compared 
to students. Half of each group (auditors and salespersons) was assigned to a decision 
accountability condition and the other half to a condition that had no mention of 
accountability. Russo et al. (2000) included a post-decision questionnaire to assess 
several predictors of the magnitude of decision distortion. These included attribute 
importance, and individual differences of (1) awareness of the possibility of distortion, 
(2) relevance of the professional decision, (3) years of experience, (4) mood, and (5) 
judgment dimension (as determined by responses to the judgment section of the Myers-
Briggs measure). 
 A two-way ANOVA revealed that the main effect of profession was marginally 
significant, and that auditors distorted information less than salespersons. Salespersons in 
the accountability condition distorted information less than their counterparts in the non-
accountability condition. The researchers pointed out that this difference arose because 
distortion of salespersons in the non-accountable condition was high, not because the 
distortion of those in the accountable condition was low. All auditors responded as if they 
were in the accountability condition in the domain of the professional decisions. 
Additional analysis revealed that attribute importance did not decrease distortion; instead, 
distortion increased marginally with higher importance ratings for salespersons. Mood 
was positively related to distortion for salespersons (the better their mood, the greater the 
distortion); however, auditors’ distortions were insensitive to mood. 
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 Overall results confirmed that both auditors and salespersons exhibited substantial 
distortion of information with little reduction for professional versus non-professional 
decisions. Auditors’ distortions were significantly less than those of salespersons; 
auditors acted as if they were always accountable. Russo et al. (2000) theorized that this 
result could have been due to auditors’ having a high degree of accountability ingrained 
in their decision making due to their normal responsibilities, training, and levels of 
supervision. 
 Beeler and Hunton (2002) examined the effects of contingent economic rents on 
audit judgments. More specifically, they hypothesized (1) that contingent economic rents 
would heighten auditors’ initial commitments to clients, (2) that there would be a positive 
relationship between initial client commitment and predecisional distortion of 
information, (3) that there would be a positive relationship between predecisional 
distortion and likelihood assessments that the client will continue as a going concern (the 
audit judgment), and (4) that there would be a negative relationship between 
predecisional distortion and revisions to budget hours (effort). These authors created a 
predecisional distortion index that combined attribute and importance ratings of pertinent 
variables and they predicted that the index would improve model fit over either factor 
alone.  
A notable feature of this study was that the 73 participants were audit partners 
from four of the Big Five firms. The two manipulated conditions were the type of 
economic rent: (1) low-balling to obtain a first year engagement, which would require an 
ongoing client relationship for the auditor to make a profit, and (2) potential non-audit 
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revenue. The primary dependent variables were a measure of initial client commitment, 
risk assessment on the client’s going concern status (audit judgment), and audit diligence 
(hours budgeted). The results of ANOVA and path analysis supported all hypotheses and 
showed that the predecisional distortion index was, indeed, more predictive than prior 
measurement techniques. Beeler and Hunton (2002) claimed that contingent economic 
rents could precipitate favorable predecisional distortion of client information, and bias 
audit judgments. 
Kadous et al. (2003) investigated the effect of requiring auditors to identify 
benchmark accounting methods (i.e., most appropriate) on the objectivity of their 
decisions to support aggressive client-preferred accounting methods. These authors noted 
that SAS No. 90, effective in 2000, addresses the appropriateness of accounting methods 
by requiring auditors to discuss the quality of client accounting methods with the audit 
committee. This standard forces auditors to make judgments about the quality of a 
client’s accounting principles rather than judgments about acceptability. Kadous et al. 
(2003) hypothesized that although standards like SAS No. 90 are designed to increase 
auditor objectivity, they may, in fact, do the opposite.  
 These researchers used Web-based survey technology to administer their 
experiment to auditors in an international accounting firm in December 2001. Participants 
returned 227 usable responses (mean audit experience was 9.63 years). The manipulated 
conditions were the requirement (or no requirement) of a quality assessment of 
accounting methods and engagement pressure (to operationalize the strength of a 
directional goal). The findings suggest that auditors who were asked to identify the best 
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method increased their commitment to their directional goals of accepting an aggressive 
client-preferred method, despite the availability of potentially higher quality methods. In 
addition, auditors who were more committed to directional goals were more likely to 
select the client-preferred method as the benchmark method. Since the results indicated 
that auditing standards may not have the desired affect of increasing auditor objectivity, 
the researchers emphasized the importance of experimental research to test the intent of 
such standards (Kadous et al. 2003). 
 In a more recent study Blay (2005) employed the risk of client loss and threat of 
litigation conditions, similar to those in Farmer et al. (1987), to examine conscious and 
unconscious choice biases. He theorized that costs related to such threats as client loss 
(which is a threat to independence) and litigation risk could potentially affect auditors at 
both the choice stage and the information processing stage of their decision making. Blay 
(2005) manipulated the independence threat of possible client loss and the litigation risk 
threat. Forty-eight audit managers from multiple offices of three Big Four firms with a 
mean experience level of 6.4 years participated in the Web-based study. Participants 
assessed the probability that the client would be a going concern before and during their 
reading of the case information. They also rated information cues as to the cue’s 
importance and positive or negative influence on the going concern evaluation. The 
participants’ final decision was whether to render a modified or non-modified audit 
opinion.  
The results of this study showed that auditors in the higher risk of client loss 
condition assessed both the initial information given and the information gathered as 
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more supportive of the client. They were also more likely to reach a client-preferred 
reporting decision. On the other hand, auditors in the higher litigation risk condition 
assessed the information gathered as less supportive of the client and were less likely to 
reach a client-preferred reporting decision.  
Additional analysis showed that in both scenarios (high risk of client loss and 
high risk of litigation) the relationship between the report choice and the threats were 
fully mediated by the final assessment of the evidence. Thus, Blay (2005) concluded that 
the audit report choices were not likely to be a pure choice effect where the auditors made 
a decision by adjusting their decision criteria. He opined that, instead, these results most 
likely represented an information processing bias. This study produced two additional 
findings of note: (1) the levels of the incentives have a significant effect on auditor 
decision making, and (2) in the presence of high risk in both conditions, auditors 
evaluated significantly more information than in any other condition. It is probable that 
the auditors in this pair of high threat conditions encountered a heightened need for 
accuracy. These findings support Kunda’s (1990) motivated reasoning theory that 
accuracy goals are likely to lead to more complex reasoning and more careful processing. 
Alternatively, it could be explained by the sufficiency principle introduced by Jain and 
Maheswaran (2000) suggesting that auditors in the high risk conditions experienced a 
greater confidence gap between actual confidence and desired confidence and, therefore, 
processed more information to bridge the gap. 
 Hunton and Rose (2007, 2008) conducted experiments to investigate self-serving 
biases of audit committee members (ACMs) in two different scenarios. The first 
 
     
 
  68
 
examined the effects of reputation threat on committee members’ decisions to accept an 
auditor’s recommendation to restate versus adjust the financial statements. Reputation 
threat was operationalized by the busy status of an ACM. A busy committee member is 
one who serves on more than one board and would presumably be more concerned that a 
reputation threat arising from one committee position might negatively influence other 
board positions. Financial statement restatements have been shown to negatively affect 
the reputations of board members as well as executive management. 
Hunton and Rose (2007) manipulated director status (busy or non-busy) and audit 
issue (restatement or adjustment recommendation). Participants were 88 ACMs with 
mean (SD) business experience of 23.34 (9.91) years. Ninety percent of the 88 were 
considered the financial expert on their respective committees and 83 percent were 
certified public accountants. ANOVA showed statistically significant main effects for 
both independent variables as well as a significant interaction effect. Planned contrasts 
further distinguished the differences among the groups and showed that within each 
separate audit issue condition the differences between busy and non-busy directors was 
significant. Moreover, the change in scores between the two audit issues was significantly 
different for the busy and the non-busy groups. The overall conclusion was that ACMs 
may pursue self-interests instead of shareholder interests in important decisions regarding 
accounting treatments. This may be particularly true of busy directors because they face 
greater reputation threats. Although the researchers pointed out that the effects of 
motivated reasoning should be considered as second order effects in this study, clearly 
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ACMs chose to make decisions that exhibited self-serving biases (Hunton and Rose 
2007). 
Hunton and Rose’s (2008) second study also examined self-serving bias of 
ACMs. This study employed the difference in perceived credibility of an anonymous 
versus a non-anonymous whistle-blowing report along with a greater or lesser threat to 
the ACM’s status as a committee member on the board of a related (interlocking) 
company. The whistle-blowing allegation, if true, would indicate that restatement of the 
financial statements would be appropriate. The threat to the ACM’s status was 
manipulated by including a statement that the other company on whose board the ACM 
served did or did not use the same accounting practice that was in question. This implied 
that if restatement were necessary for the subject company that it would be appropriate 
for the related company as well. 
Similar to the earlier study, Hunton and Rose (2008) used a between-participants 
2 x 2 experimental design. Participants were 83 ACMs with mean (SD) business 
experience of 23.05 (10.06) years, and 74.7 percent were considered the financial expert 
on their respective committees and were also certified public accountants. The 
independent variables were the whistle-blowing report source (anonymous or non-
anonymous) and board interlock threat (presence or absence). The two dependent 
variables were the perceived credibility of the whistle-blowing report and the dollar 
amount of resources that the participant chose to allocate to investigate the whistle-
blowing allegation. The ANOVA with the rating of the creditability of the whistle-
blowing report as the dependent variable showed statistically significant main effects for 
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both independent variables as well as a significant interaction effect. Likewise, the 
ANOVA with the dollar value of investigative resources allocated as the dependent 
variable showed statistically significant main effects for both independent variables. 
Several debriefing questions provided additional insights on the thought processes and 
possible motives of the ACMs. Hunton and Rose (2008) concluded that interlocking 
directors with a conflict of interest appear to favor their personal reputations over their 
obligations to shareholders and other stakeholders. The committee members with higher 
threats to their reputations demonstrated a biased processing of the information contained 
in the whistle-blowing report. In addition, those who believed the whistle-blower to be 
anonymous rationalized their decision by ascribing lower creditability to the report 
allegations.  
Hypotheses Development 
Anonymous Whistle-Blowing  
Anonymous whistle-blowing sometimes creates an ethical dilemma because the 
whistle-blower attempts to hide while revealing the identity and alleged wrongdoing of 
an accused party (Elliston et al.1985). In hiding their identities, anonymous whistle-
blowers do not allow whistle-blowing report recipients to evaluate their personal 
characteristics as a means to at least partially determine the veracity of the report. More 
specifically, two of the most important characteristics that strongly influence whistle-
blowing efficacy, the whistle-blower’s power and credibility, cannot be established (Near 
and Miceli 1995). Source credibility has been shown to be an important factor in audit 
judgment and decision making (Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994; DeZoort et al. 2003). 
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Moreover, anonymous sources have been judged to be less trustworthy, demonstrate less 
goodwill, be associated with negative irrelevant information, and have less credibility 
(Rains 2007; Hunton and Rose 2008). It is also possible that CAEs, being role-prescribed 
whistle-blowers (Miceli and Near 1992), may not be as sensitive to the peer pressure and 
fear of retaliation that may cause a whistle-blower in another position to decide to report 
anonymously (Johnson et al. 1993; Near et al. 1993). On the other hand, anonymous 
whistle-blowing should be more acceptable since regulators continue to encourage 
anonymous reporting and SOX now requires public companies to establish and monitor 
anonymous whistle-blowing channels.  
Given these arguments in total the following hypothesis is formed about the 
perceptions of CAEs with regard to the credibility of anonymous versus non-anonymous 
whistle-blowing reports: 
Hypothesis 1a: CAEs will perceive anonymous whistle-blowing allegations to be 
   less credible than non-anonymous whistle-blowing allegations. 
 
 
Recent studies showed that although whistle-blowing is an important fraud 
detection mechanism, whistle-blowing reports from employees have been declining since 
the establishment of the anonymous channels mandated by SOX (Kaplan and Schultz 
2007; Dyck et. al 2007). It follows that more emphasis should be placed on the whistle-
blowing reports that are received, whether anonymous or non-anonymous. Furthermore, 
anonymous whistle-blowing reports may be more time consuming and difficult to 
investigate because the report recipient cannot consult with the whistle-blower to gather 
additional information (Miceli and Near 1992; Near and Miceli 1995). Although 
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anonymous reports may require more resources than non-anonymous reports for thorough 
investigation, credibility is also a factor (Hunton and Rose 2008). If a CAE has past 
experience with poor results from anonymous whistle-blowing reports, the CAE is likely 
to doubt the wisdom of allocating the additional resources that may be required to 
investigate allegations received in such a manner. Consequently, the following hypothesis 
regarding how CAEs will choose to allocate resources to investigate whistle-blowing 
reports is offered: 
Hypothesis 1b: CAEs will allocate fewer resources to investigating anonymous whistle- 
   blowing reports than they will allocate to investigating non-anonymous 
   whistle-blowing reports. 
 
Motivated Reasoning 
 Internal auditors are instrumental in maintaining and evaluating their companies’ 
internal control environments, especially the internal controls over financial reporting. 
The discovery of fraudulent financial reporting might indicate that the CAE had not 
succeeded in detecting and preventing fraud. If fraudulent reporting is accomplished 
through exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls, this would be a clear 
signal that the CAE had failed in some critical aspect of responsibility to assist executive 
management in maintaining sufficiently strong internal controls over financial reporting. 
On the other hand, if fraudulent reporting is accomplished by the circumvention of 
internal controls, the CAE would be less likely to shoulder primary responsibility. 
Consequently, this study adopts the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal 
controls and the circumvention of internal controls as operationalizations of higher and 
lower levels, respectively, of reputation threat.  
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 Motivated reasoning theories explain that decision makers sometimes use biased 
cognitive processes as strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. 
Moreover, needs and motives often influence mental processes in a way that enables the 
decision maker to maintain an illusion of objectivity (Kunda 1990, Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg 1987). Decision makers may engage in biased information evaluation and 
processing to arrive at the conclusion they want to adopt. They may also ignore 
applicable statistical heuristics or employ inappropriate heuristics. Ambiguity in the 
situation can aid in the justification of such information processing biases. 
Motivated reasoning also addresses how a particular reason may be adopted to 
explain an unusual or unexpected event. Individuals are active information processors 
who engage in causal selection when attempting to make sense of such an occurrence. 
Each person’s causal background is a combination of past experience, available 
information, and cognitive processes that can lead individuals in the same organization to 
generate different explanations for the same event (Rousseau and Tijoriwala 1999). 
 A CAE’s reputation will be more seriously threatened if a financial reporting 
fraud has been perpetrated via an exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal 
controls compared to the circumvention of internal controls. Auditors do consider the 
perceived personal costs when deciding to report wrongdoing (Kaplan and Whitecotton 
2001). It follows that they would also consider personal costs when deciding to 
investigate a whistle-blowing report. Consequently, a CAE with a more serious 
reputation threat has a greater motivation to evaluate the information in the whistle-
blowing report as less credible overall. Therefore, the related hypothesis is considered: 
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Hypothesis 2a: CAEs who receive a whistle-blowing allegation that suggests that the 
  fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in 
  internal controls (circumvention of internal controls) will assess the 
  allegation to be less (more) credible. 
 
 
 The quantity processing view of motivated reasoning purports that decision 
makers will process a larger quantity of information when new information is preference-
inconsistent than when it is preference-consistent (Ditto and Lopez 1992). The 
sufficiency principle provides the psychological mechanism for this tendency by 
suggesting that the larger the gap between a decision maker’s actual confidence level and 
the desired confidence level, the more information the decision maker will process and 
evaluate in an attempt to close the gap. Preference-inconsistent information has been 
shown to widen this gap by lowering the actual confidence level (Jain and Maheswaran 
2000). Although Ditto and Lopez (1992) submitted that the quantity processing view 
supports both accuracy and directional goals, based on other information processing bias 
studies (e.g. Russo et al. 1996), it appears that the quantity of processing view is most 
often applicable to accuracy goals. 
 Clearly a whistle-blowing report that alleges fraudulent financial reporting is new 
information that is preference-inconsistent for a CAE. If the CAE is driven primarily by 
an accuracy goal, then the desire to investigate such allegations should be strong. It 
follows that an allegation that the fraud was perpetrated in such a way as to seriously 
threaten the CAE’s reputation would be viewed as even more preference-inconsistent 
than an allegation that suggests the fraud was perpetrated via a less threatening method. 
 
     
 
  75
 
Hence, a CAE with predecision bias toward an accuracy goal may be expected to allocate 
significant resources to gather and evaluate more information in the serious threat 
scenario. In contrast, a CAE with an overriding directional goal (e.g. self-esteem, self-
preservation, desire to maintain control, desire to maintain consistency) may make a 
different choice. Based on research regarding directional goals, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2b: CAEs who receive a whistle-blowing allegation that suggests that the 
   fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in 
   internal controls (circumvention of internal controls) will allocate fewer 
   (more) resources toward investigating the allegation. 
 
Anonymous Whistle-Blowing and Motivated Reasoning 
 As explained above, the moral dilemma of the responsibility to follow up on 
allegations of financial statement fraud that may, if proven to be true, harm one’s 
reputation could certainly provide the catalyst for biased directional goals in predecision 
processing. Nevertheless, individuals are not at liberty to believe whatever they wish.  
Extant research shows that individuals are committed to rational inferential processes. 
Within these rational processes they may attempt to build justifications for their preferred 
conclusions. However, the need to justify the reasonableness of both the process and the 
conclusion constrains the tendency to adopt biased processing strategies (Sanitioso and 
Kunda 1991; Boiney et al. 1997). 
 The inability of a CAE to establish the power and credibility of an anonymous 
whistle-blower provides ambiguity to this scenario that does not exist when the whistle-
blower is non-anonymous. Having no information about the whistle-blower from which 
to derive beliefs other than the fact that the reporter belongs to the group of anonymous 
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whistle-blowers, the CAE may be forced to adjust general beliefs about the group 
(anonymous reporters) in accordance with the CAE’s goals (Klein and Kunda 1992). 
Thus, this additional ambiguity may be used to justify the preferred conclusion that the 
report that poses the most serious reputation threat (the fraud was perpetrated through 
exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls) is the least credible and is 
least worthy of investigation. Consequently, the following two hypotheses regarding the 
interaction of whistle-blowing report source and reputation threat are offered: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The difference in perceived credibility of a whistle-blowing allegation 
   between anonymous and non-anonymous reporting will be significantly 
   greater when the allegation suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by  
   the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls relative to 
   when the fraud was perpetrated by the circumvention of internal 
   controls. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The difference in investigatory resource allocation between anonymous 
   and non-anonymous reporting will be significantly greater when the 
   allegation suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of 
   substantial weaknesses in internal controls relative to when the fraud 
   was perpetrated by the circumvention of internal controls. 
 
The Mediation Effects of Credibility 
The theory elaborated above suggests that an anonymous whistle-blowing report 
(compared to a non-anonymous report) and the presence of a more serious reputation 
threat (compared to a less serious reputation threat) will lower the perceived credibility of 
the whistle-blowing allegation. Accordingly, these conditions will result in a decrease in 
the amount of resources allocated to the investigation of the allegation. Hence, the final 
hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 4: Perceived credibility of the whistle-blowing allegation will mediate the 
effect of whistle-blowing report source and reputation threat on the dollar                        
amount of investigatory resource allocation. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
The Participants 
Forty-seven CAEs and 47 CAE Deputies (Deputies) from companies in the 
eastern half of the United States participated in the study. Several respondents failed the 
manipulation checks, one Deputy did not complete key variables, and one Deputy listed 
less than one year of internal audit experience. After these were excluded, the final 
sample consisted of 40 CAEs and 41 Deputies. Table 1 shows the identification of the  
Table 1 - Sample Identification 
 
CAEs Deputies Total
Original Sample 47 47 94
Failed manipulation check 7 4 11
Failed to complete dependent 0 1 1
variable measures
Less than 1 year of internal 0 1 1
audit experience
Total Responses Included 40 41 81  
final sample. The Deputy-level individuals were included based on the expectation that 
they also have significant responsibilities and could easily be expected to have 
knowledge of the CAE’s work with the audit committee. CAEs and Deputies are an 
important participant group that is largely understudied. More importantly, this group 
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provides an accurate participant-task match for the present study and improves the 
validity as well as the generalizability of the results.  
Demographic Information 
The mean years (standard deviation) of participants’ internal audit experience is 
13.11 (8.23). Participants also have mean external audit experience of 2.63 (3.45) years 
and mean corporate accounting experience of 3.37 (5.68) years. The mean tenure with the 
current organization is 9.40 (9.06) years. This data is displayed separately for CAEs and 
Deputies in Table 2. A test of differences in means revealed that there are no statistically 
significant differences in the experience levels or tenure of CAEs when compared to 
Deputies. 
In total, 49 (60.5%) participants are CPAs and 40 (49.4%) are CIAs. Ten (12.3%) 
are Certified Fraud Examiners, 17 (21.0%) are Certified Information Systems Auditors 
(CISA), and six (7.4%) are Certified Financial Services Auditors (CFSA). The CISA and 
the CFSA are specialty designations associated with the IIA. Finally, four (4.9%) 
participants are Certified Management Accountants and ten (12.3%) hold other 
professional credentials. Overall, ten (12.35%) individuals listed more than two 
professional certifications, 26 (32.10%) listed two certifications, and 43 (53.09%) listed 
one certification. Only two (2.47%) participants did not list any professional 
certifications. Table 2 shows detailed information regarding professional certifications. 
 Of the 94 original participants, 78 (83.0%) were from publicly traded companies, 
10 (10.6%) were from non-public, for profit companies, and 6 (6.4%) were from 
government agencies or large universities. All organizations included have a board of  
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Table 2 - Demographic Information 
 
Retained Sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Experience and Tenure (Years)
Internal Audit 14.53 8.53 11.73 7.78 13.11 8.23
External Audit 3.18 3.97 2.10 2.81 2.63 3.45
Corporate Accounting 3.69 6.25 3.05 5.13 3.37 5.68
Tenure - Current Organization 9.11 9.15 9.69 9.07 9.40 9.06
Number % Number % Number %
Professional Certifications
Certified Public Accountant 27 67.5% 22 53.7% 49 60.5%
Certified Internal Auditor 19 47.5% 21 51.2% 40 49.4%
Certified Fraud Examiner 5 12.5% 5 12.2% 10 12.3%
Certified Information Systems Auditor 6 15.0% 11 26.8% 17 21.0%
Certified Financial Services Auditor 4 10.0% 2 4.9% 6 7.4%
Certified Management Accountant 2 5.0% 2 4.9% 4 4.9%
Other Professional Certifications 6 15.0% 4 9.8% 10 12.3%
(36 participants hold > 1 certification)
Number % Number % Number %
Public / Non-Public Status
Not-Publicly Traded 8 20.0% 6 14.6% 14 17.3%
Publicly Traded 32 80.0% 35 85.4% 67 82.7%
40 100.0% 41 100.0% 81 100.0%
Original Samplea
Number % Number % Number %
Stock Exchange Status
Not for Profit / Gov Agency 3 6.4% 3 6.7% 6 6.4%
For Profit, Not Public 7 14.9% 3 6.7% 10 10.6%
NYSE 28 59.6% 38 84.4% 66 70.2%
NASDAQ 8 17.0% 2 4.4% 10 10.6%
Other Exchange 1 2.1% 1 2.2% 2 2.1%
47 100.0% 47 104.4% 94 100.0%
Number % Number % Number %
Fortune 1000 (2008) Status
Fortune 250 9 19.1% 23 48.9% 32 34.0%
Fortune 251 - 500 6 12.8% 6 12.8% 12 12.8%
Fortune 501 - 750 9 19.1% 4 8.5% 13 13.8%
Fortune 751 - 1000 3 6.4% 3 6.4% 6 6.4%
Public - Not Ranked 10 21.3% 5 10.6% 15 16.0%
Not Public 10 21.3% 6 12.8% 16 17.0%
47 100.0% 47 100.0% 94 100.0%
a Responses were anonymous; therefore, the companies representing the deleted repsonses
cannot be determined.
CAEs Deputies Total Sample
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directors and the internal audit function is accountable to the board. Of the ten 
participants from non-public companies, five were former CAEs of public companies, 
and/or hold senior positions in consulting firms that perform internal audit functions for 
public companies. The remaining five are in large private companies that comply with 
SOX. Sixty-six participants (70.2%) are from companies listed on the NYSE and another 
10 (10.6%) are from companies traded on NASDAQ. Sixty-three participants (67.0%) are 
in companies listed in the Fortune 1000 for 2008 (CNNMoney.com 2008). Thirty-two 
(34.0%) are from companies that are ranked 250 or higher, 12 (12.8%) are in companies 
ranked between 251 and 500, 13 (13.8%) are in companies ranked between 501 and 750, 
and another six (6.4%) are in companies that are ranked between 701 and 1000. Table 2 
shows the detail of the stock exchange and Fortune 1000 status of participants’ 
companies. Since responses were anonymous, these company specific demographic 
statistics cannot be separately determined for the retained participants.  
The Task 
 The task for this inquiry was a case that was adapted from Hunton and Rose 
(2008). First, each participant was asked to assume the role of CAE for a hypothetical 
company, BioMeasure, Inc. The CAE was told that the internal audit function has 
evaluated the company’s internal controls for 2006 and reported to management that no 
material weaknesses in controls were found. It is now December of 2007 and the annual 
financial statements for 2006 have been audited by the external auditors and publicly 
released. Participants were then presented with a brief background of the company. 
Salient information included the fact that corporate fraud has not been a problem for 
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BioMeasure in the past and that the external (Big Four) auditor has always issued clean 
opinions. The CAE reports functionally to the audit committee and administratively to 
senior executives. BioMeasure has implemented an anonymous whistle-blowing system 
as required by SOX and up to this point no significant financial frauds have been 
identified through any whistle-blowing reporting channel. Next, the CAE was informed 
that a whistle-blowing report was received in December of 2007 alleging that senior 
managers materially overstated earnings for 2006 in order to earn their bonuses. The 
language in the report itself varies to create the four experimental conditions (see 
Appendix).  
The allegation of earnings management meets Jones’ (1991) criteria for an issue 
of significant moral intensity. Hence, the scenario described should result in the CAE 
recognizing the existence of an important moral issue and engaging in a moral decision 
making process.1 The final sentence in the case states, “You have determined that should 
the allegation be true, a restatement of 2006 revenue would be necessary.” The purpose 
of this statement is to reinforce the understanding that the allegation creates a reputation 
threat to the CAE. Financial restatements have been shown to cause a loss of shareholder 
trust and investment capital (Linn and Diehl 2005) and to discredit management and 
significantly increase management turnover (Desai et al. 2006; Gersten et al. 2006). 
Following the case information, participants were asked to respond to two questions that 
were used as dependent variables.  
 
1 This scenario was pilot tested by interviewing several financial experts who remarked that earnings 
management represents a claim that warrants thorough investigation (Hunton and Rose 2008). 
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Part Two of the study included manipulation check questions and solicited 
additional information from the participants. Manipulation check questions are important 
in between-subjects designs to ensure that the participants attended to and interpreted 
correctly the independent variables described in the case. The responses to the 
manipulation check questions can be particularly helpful if there is an insignificant 
treatment effect because the underlying reason could be that the manipulated condition 
was not correctly incorporated into the participants thought processes (Libby et al. 2002). 
Consequently, the first two debriefing questions were manipulation check questions to 
test the recognition and comprehension of the whistle-blowing report source and the 
alleged method of wrongdoing. 
The manipulation check questions were followed by 24 additional debriefing 
questions. Nine of the 24 sought information regarding demographics, actual reporting 
relationships, and the participants’ past experiences with whistle-blowing reports and 
their investigations. The remaining 15 questions collected information to bring additional 
insights to the experimental results and were based on the theory used for this study. 
CAEs are busy executives, thus the case and debriefing questions were designed to 
require a maximum of 15 to 20 minutes of a participant’s time. The researchers visited 
the offices of the participants to administer the case study.  
The Experimental Design 
 This study used a 2 x 2 factorial experimental design. The first manipulated 
condition was report source, either anonymous or non-anonymous. Although a primary 
purpose of the whistle-blowing channel mandated by SOX was to provide for anonymous 
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reports, employees also use the channel for non-anonymous reporting. A benchmark 
report on the use of hotlines revealed that more than half (54 %) of the calls received 
were anonymous (Security Executive Council 2007).  
The second manipulated condition was reputation threat. The less serious 
reputation threat condition stated that the fraudulent reporting was allegedly 
accomplished by a circumvention of internal controls. The more serious reputation threat 
alleged that the fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in 
internal controls. 
 Because the focus of this study was judgment and decision making, a between-
subjects design was used to afford a set of circumstances that CAEs might reasonably 
expect to encounter in the normal course of business, and therefore, should solicit CAEs’ 
natural reasoning processes. A within-subjects design draws more attention to the 
independent variables of interest and can create demand effects (Kahneman and Tversky 
1996). CAEs would not normally encounter communications alleging fraudulent financial 
reporting on a recurring basis in the real world; thus, a repetitive task design would 
detract from the study’s realism. Accordingly, each participant was assigned to only one 
experimental condition.  
The Independent Variables: Report Source and Reputation Threat 
 The whistle-blowing allegation contained a manipulation of the report source, 
which was either anonymous or non-anonymous. The seriousness of reputation threat was 
manipulated by the method of wrongdoing. In the less serious reputation threat condition, 
the fraud was allegedly perpetrated by the circumvention of internal controls. In the 
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serious reputation threat condition, the fraud was allegedly perpetrated by the exploitation 
of substantial weaknesses in internal controls (see Appendix).  
Internal auditors play a key role in maintaining and testing compliance with 
internal controls over financial reporting. Consequently, the discovery of a breach in 
controls that internal audit had previously inspected might indicate that the CAE had not 
been as diligent as expected in overseeing the evaluation process. Although the revelation 
of fraudulent reporting by the circumvention of internal controls would also be 
disturbing, it would not necessarily imply ineffectiveness on the part of internal audit or 
the CAE. 
The Dependent Variables: Credibility and Resource Allocation 
 After reading the case, participants were asked to assess the credibility of the 
whistle-blowing report using a scale of 0% (not credible at all) to 100% (completely 
credible). Next, participants were asked to determine the amount of resources that they 
would allocate to investigate the whistle-blowing allegation. Resource allocation 
decisions always involve trade-offs in an actual business environment. Therefore, to 
make this question more effective in engaging the CAE in the judgment and decision 
making task, the scenario generated tension by including such a trade-off.  
Control Variables 
 A number of questions were included in Part Two of the study that could be used 
as control variables in the analysis of the data. The topics of questions used to collect 
demographic information were: (1) years of experience in internal audit, (2) years of 
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experience in external audit, (3) years of experience in corporate accounting, (4) tenure in 
the current organization, and (5) professional designations.  
Pilot Study 
 The pilot study for this study included feedback from interviews with a prominent 
Fortune 200 CAE with significant internal audit experience. He agreed that the overall 
case scenario was realistic. As a CAE, he is charged with investigating whistle-blowing 
reports and allocating appropriate resources to conduct investigations. He stated that 
these responsibilities are typical of someone in his position and that a report alleging 
earnings management should definitely be investigated, regardless of the source. He also 
opined that anonymous reports are almost always more difficult and more expensive to 
investigate. Further, this CAE claimed that the alleged method of wrongdoing 
(exploitation or circumvention) should have no effect on the intention to investigate the 
report. Based on this expert’s comments and Hunton and Rose’s (2008) pilot study of a 
similar case, the final experimental case study for the present inquiry was developed and 
employed (see Appendix for the complete case study). 
Tests of Hypotheses  
The following sub-sections describe the intended plan of analyses for testing the 
study hypotheses. Chapter IV of this dissertation presents the details of the tests that were 
conducted. 
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Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
An ANOVA will be conducted with credibility as the dependent variable to 
determine the significance of the main effects of the two treatments, report source and 
reputation threat. If the main effect for report source is significant, Hypothesis 1a will be 
evaluated by comparing the mean of credibility scores reported by participants in the 
anonymous condition with those in the non-anonymous condition. This hypothesis will 
be considered supported if the mean of credibility scores in the anonymous condition is 
lower. Similarly, Hypothesis 2a will be supported if the ANOVA shows the main effect 
of reputation threat to be significant and if the mean of the credibility scores of 
participants in the exploitation condition is lower than the mean of the credibility scores 
of those in the circumvention condition. 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
A second ANOVA will be conducted with resource allocation as the dependent 
variable to determine the significance of the main effects of the two treatments. If the 
main effect for report source is significant, Hypothesis 1b will be evaluated by comparing 
the mean of dollars allocated by participants in the anonymous condition with those in the 
non-anonymous condition. Hypothesis 1b will be supported if the mean of dollars 
allocated in the anonymous condition is lower. Likewise, Hypothesis 2b will be 
supported if the ANOVA shows the main effect of reputation threat to be significant and 
if the mean of the dollars allocated by participants in the exploitation condition is lower 
than the mean of dollars allocated by participants in the circumvention condition. 
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that the interaction of report source and 
reputation threat will be significant. If the ANOVA with credibility as the dependent 
variable shows a significant interaction, Hypothesis 3a will be evaluated by a planned 
contrast. Hypothesis 3a predicts that the difference in the credibility assessment between 
anonymous and non-anonymous report source will be significantly greater when the 
method of wrongdoing is exploitation compared to circumvention. First, the difference 
between the means of the credibility scores of those in the anonymous report source/ 
exploitation reputation threat condition and those in the non-anonymous/ exploitation 
condition will be calculated. Next, the difference between the means of the credibility  
Anonymous x Exploitation (A/E) - Non-anonymous x Exploitation (NA/E) = A
Anonymous x Circumvention (A/C) - Non-anonymous x Circumvention (NA/C) = B
A > B
A/E
A/C
NA/E
NA/C
Difference
A
Difference
B
 
Figure 1 - Example of Contrast for Hypothesis 3a 
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scores of those in the anonymous report source/circumvention reputation threat condition 
and those in the non-anonymous/circumvention condition will be determined. Hypothesis 
3a will be supported if the contrast between these differences is statistically significant. 
Figure 1 is an example of how this analysis will be presented. 
The evaluation of Hypothesis 3b will be similar. If the ANOVA with resource 
allocation as the dependent variable verifies that the interaction of report source with 
reputation threat is significant, then the planned contrast will be conducted. The 
differences in differences will be determined as explained above and these two 
differences will be contrasted. A statistically significant result will support Hypothesis 
3b. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that perceived credibility will mediate the relationship 
between report source and the dollar amount of investigatory resources allocated. 
Hypothesis 4 also predicts that perceived credibility will mediate the relationship 
between reputation threat and the dollar amount of investigatory resources allocated. This 
hypothesis will be tested using path analysis in LISREL because the use of separate 
regression equations to evaluate a mediation effect does not allow for shared variance 
between the two variables. Path analysis in LISREL uses maximum likelihood with full 
information and estimates the equations simultaneously. Consequently, the standard error 
should be smaller and the parameter estimates more accurate. Also, the LISREL method 
provides goodness of fit measurements for evaluating model fit. The disadvantage of 
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using simultaneous equations is that the misspecification of one equation (one path) will 
affect the whole model.  
One caveat to relying on fit measures for this study is the potential effect of a 
small sample size. The first test statistic reported for path models is the chi-square 
statistic. Because the null hypothesis assumes perfect fit, a small test statistic and a large 
p-value (that indicates the null cannot be rejected) are desirable. The chi-square is 
sensitive to sample size and rewards a small sample. Consequently, because the chi-
square test is not a valid criterion for evaluating the overall fit of the proposed model for 
the present study, other fit indices will be considered.2  The various goodness of fit 
indices focus on different aspects of the structural model. Some are sensitive to sample 
size, some are not; some reward parsimony and others reward lack of parsimony. Cortina 
and Blundau (2007) recommend reporting both the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) because these two indices differ on 
important measures. Pertinent to the current study, both of these measures are not ample 
size dependent and not estimation method specific. The CFI is relative and does not 
account for parsimony, while the RMSEA is an absolute measure that rewards 
parsimony. Accordingly, the path model for the current study will be primarily evaluated 
using these two fit indices. A value of .95 or higher is indicative of good model fit for the 
CFI. For the RMSEA, values below .05 indicate a good fit and values between .05 and 
.08 indicate a fair fit (Kline 2005).  
 
2 The chi-square difference test can be used appropriately to compare mediation models and may be used 
for that purpose in the current study. 
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The theoretical path model (Figure 2) shows that perceived credibility is expected 
to fully mediate the relationship between whistle-blowing report source and the allocation  
 
−
+
−
−
Report Source
0 = Non-Anonymous
1 = Anonymous
Reputation Threat
0 = Circumvention
1 = Exploitation
Perceived
Credibility of the 
Report
Investigatory
Resource
Allocation
 
Figure 2 - Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 4 
of resources, but only partially mediate the relationship between reputation threat and 
allocation of resources. If the report source is anonymous, then the value for report source 
is 1, otherwise 0. Thus, the relationship between report source and credibility is predicted 
to be negative. If the wrongdoing method is exploitation, then the value for reputation 
threat is 1, otherwise 0. Consequently, the relationships between the reputation threat and 
credibility and resource allocation are hypothesized to be negative. However, the path 
between credibility and resource allocation is predicted to have a positive coefficient. 
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Additional Analysis 
The information gathered from the answers to the debriefing questions should add 
insight to the issues underlying the motivated reasoning that is hypothesized in the study. 
Two of these questions were additional measures of credibility and another asked how 
important credibility was in the participant’s decision to allocate resources. Three 
questions addressed perceived reputation threat and two questions targeted perceived 
responsibility for the wrongdoing. Another question addressed accountability, and two 
questions addressed the interpretation of new information. This data was first examined 
with confirmatory factor analysis to determine if the intended measures of individual 
constructs exhibited convergent validity and if the constructs exhibited discriminate 
validity. Differences in means among the groups were then compared using planned 
contrasts. 
In addition to questions about motivated reasoning, the debriefing section 
contained several inquiries soliciting the participant’s opinion about the helpfulness of 
the anonymous whistle-blowing channel. These were directed at gaining insights about 
the whistle-blowing mandates included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Similar 
questions were asked of ACMs in Hunton and Rose (2008); consequently, the responses 
of the CAEs in this study will be compared to the responses of ACMs in the prior study.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Diagnostic Procedures 
Manipulation Checks 
 The first two debriefing questions were manipulation check questions to test 
participants’ recognition and comprehension of the whistle-blowing report source and the 
alleged method of wrongdoing. All participants responded correctly to the question 
addressing the report source (anonymous or non-anonymous). However, 11 participants 
did not respond correctly to the question addressing the method of wrongdoing. Thus, 
these 11 individuals were excluded from further analysis (see Table 1). 
Diagnostic Tests 
 First, standard diagnostic steps to test for data entry errors and validity of 
statistical assumptions were performed. All responses were in the minimum to maximum 
range of the scale for each question. Levene’s tests revealed that the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was not violated for any variable. Skewness and kurtosis measures 
of the variables indicated no significant violations of the normal distribution assumption, 
however the Kolmogotov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests revealed that the distribution 
of the two dependent variables is not normal. Since the models formed with these data 
were not used for predictive purposes, this violation was not critical. Observations are 
independent in that each participant was assigned to only one condition.  
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Factor Analysis 
 Several debriefing questions were designed to measure perceived reputation 
threat, responsibility, and accuracy goal, and also as additional measures of report source 
credibility. Principal components factor analysis with direct oblimin rotation was used to 
validate the convergent and divergent validity of these measures. An oblique rotation was 
employed because these psychological measures are clearly related. The analysis 
included Credibility of Individual (Q3CR2), Responsibility of IA (Q4RS1), Reputation 
CAE (Q5RP1), Importance of Credibility (Q7CRDS), Importance of Justification 
(Q8JUST), Probability Report is True (Q9PROB), Personal Responsibility (Q10RS2), 
Effect Reputation (Q11RP2), and IA Dept Reputation (Q12RP3). The KMO measure of 
sampling adequacy was acceptable at .676 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant (p < .000) indicating that the R matrix was not an identity matrix and that 
factor analysis was appropriate for this data. A review of the anti-image correlation 
matrix revealed the KMO for all variables was above .5 and that the off-diagonal values 
were acceptable. 
 The pattern matrix showed that the three reputation questions (Q5RP1, Q11RP2, 
and Q12RP3) loaded on one factor at .972, .957, and .891 respectively. The credibility 
questions (Q3CR2 and Q9PROB) loaded on the second factor at .869 and .834 
respectively. The responsibility questions (Q4RS1 and Q10RS2) loaded on the third 
factor at .919 and .821 respectively, and the accuracy goal questions (Q7CRDS and 
Q8JUST) loaded on the fourth factor at .872 and .794 respectively. All other loadings had 
absolute values of .215 or less. A score was calculated for each factor using the means of 
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the questions that loaded on that factor. The questions within each of the four factors had 
the same response scale so no recoding of data was necessary. These four new variables 
are REPUSC (Reputation Score), CREDSC (Credibility Score), RESBSC (Responsibility 
Score), and ACCRSC (Accuracy Score). The pattern matrix is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Factor Analysis – Pattern Matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4
Effect Reputation (Q11) 0.972 -0.025 0.015 -0.023
IA Dept Reputation (Q12) 0.957 -0.022 -0.020 0.052
Reputation CAE (Q5) 0.891 0.062 -0.005 -0.039
Credibility Indiv (Q3) 0.049 0.869 0.052 -0.053
Probability WB True (Q9) -0.035 0.834 -0.128 0.055
Responsibility of IA (Q4) 0.124 -0.033 0.919 0.002
Pers Responsibility (Q10) -0.215 -0.057 0.821 0.012
Impt Cred in Decision (Q7) -0.002 -0.139 -0.151 0.872
Impt of Justification (Q8) -0.019 0.166 0.194 0.794
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Component
 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
Diagnostics for Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
 Hypotheses 1a and 2a were both tested using ANOVA with Credibility Assess 
(CRED) as the dependent variable. As a preliminary step, regression analyses were 
conducted to test for the significance of demographic variables. The primary independent 
variables of Report Source (REPSOR) and Reputation Threat (REPTHR) were included 
along with the following demographic variables: Participant is CAE (CAE; coded as 1 if 
the participant was a CAE and 0 if a Deputy), Participant is CPA (Q20CPA), Participant 
is CIA (Q20CIA), Participant Has Other Designation (Q20OTH), Years of Internal Audit 
Experience (Q21EIA), Years of External Audit Experience (Q21EEA), Years of 
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Corporate Accounting Experience (Q21ECA), Years of Tenure with Current 
Organization (Q22TEN), and Publicly Traded Status (PUB). The PUB variable was 
coded as 1 if the participant’s company was publicly traded, 0 otherwise.  
Two different variable entry methods (stepwise and enter) were used. The 
stepwise method showed two significant covariates, Q20CPA (p < .022) and PUB (p < 
.010), while the enter method also yielded two, PUB (p < .021) and Q22TEN (p < .039). 
REPSOR and REPTHR remained significant (p < .050) in both of these models. The R2a 
for the stepwise model was .221 and the R2a for the enter model was .216. The enter 
method model indicated that all variance inflation factors (VIFs) were greater than one, 
but less than two, indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue. 
 Influence diagnostics were then analyzed for two models; one included Q20CPA 
and PUB and the other included PUB and Q22TEN. The problem cases were the same for 
both models, consequently this discussion focuses on the model with Q20CPA and PUB. 
Five cases had an R-Student statistic with an absolute value greater than two. Case #60 
had a value of 4.198 and Case #68 was the next highest at 2.673. Cook’s D was highest 
for Case #33 (.157) and Case #60 (.140). Hat diagonal values were not of concern as 
none of the cases had a value greater than 0.124 (calculated at 2p/n = 10/81).3 The 
COVRATIO for each of three cases was less than the benchmark of 1 – 3p/n = .815. Case 
#9 was .779, Case #60 was .390, and Case #68 was .728. None of the absolute values for 
the DFFITS statistic exceeded two. An R-Student statistic greater than two indicates that 
an observation may be an outlier. A COVRATIO that is less than the benchmark value 
 
3 This is expected as a high HAT diagonal would indicate a high leverage point (an unusual value for an 
independent variable). All independent variables in this model carried values of 1 or 0. 
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indicates that an observation is having a negative influence on the regression model. 
Because of its extreme diagnostic values, Case #60 was deemed to be an outlier. 
A regression analysis with Q20CPA and PUB as covariates was then conducted 
with Case #60 removed. PUB was significant at p < .002 and Q20CPA was significant at 
p < .033. REPSOR and REPTHR were both significant at p < .050. The R2a for this 
model was .310. An ANCOVA (n = 80) with REPSOR, REPTHR, both the Q20CPA and 
PUB covariates, and the interaction term for REPSOR and REPTHR showed PUB to be 
significant at p < .002 and Q20CPA to be significant at p < .035. REPSOR was 
significant at p < .000 and REPTHR was significant at p < .002. The interaction between 
these two variables was insignificant at p < .980. The R2a for this model was .301. 
Finally, an ANCOVA with only PUB as a covariate showed PUB to be significant at p < 
.002, REPSOR to be significant at p < .001, REPTHR to be significant at p < .001, and 
the interaction to be insignificant at p < .983. The R2a for this model was .267. 
 The primary variables of interest, REPSOR and REPTHR, remained statistically 
significant at p < .050 or less for all versions of the model and the interaction remained 
clearly insignificant; consequently, the choice of model did not appear to be critical to the 
testing of Hypotheses 1a and 2a. The model containing only the primary variables, their 
interaction, and the covariate PUB was, therefore, retained for testing Hypotheses 1a and 
2a. This model was parsimonious and included the most significant covariate. The 
responses of all participants except Case #60 were used (n = 80). Levene’s test for 
equality of error variances for this model was insignificant (p < .380) and the R2a was 
.267.   
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Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a were both tested using ANCOVA with Credibility Assess 
(CRED) as the dependent variable. Hypotheses 1a states that CAEs will perceive 
anonymous whistle-blowing allegations to be less credible than non-anonymous whistle-
blowing allegations. Table 4, Panel A shows means, standard deviations, and sample size 
for the credibility assessment across treatment conditions. Panel B shows the results of 
the ANCOVA with CRED as the dependent variable and REPSOR, REPTHR, along with 
the interaction term and the covariate PUB as independent variables. The variable for 
REPSOR was significant (F = 10.968, p < .001). The pattern of means in Panel A 
indicates that credibility assessments were lower for anonymous reports (.413) than for 
non-anonymous reports (.520); thus Hypothesis 1a is supported. 
Hypotheses 2a states that CAEs who receive a whistle-blowing allegation that 
suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in 
internal controls (circumvention of internal controls) will assess the allegation to be less 
(more) credible. The results of the ANCOVA presented in Table 4, Panel B also shows 
that the variable REPTHR was significant (F = 10.526, p < .002). The pattern of means in 
Panel A indicates that mean credibility assessments were lower for wrongdoing allegedly 
accomplished by exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls (.403) than 
for that accomplished by circumvention of internal controls (.529); thus, Hypothesis 2a is 
supported. Some of the participants explained4 the reasoning for their responses to the  
 
 
4 Many participants wrote comments in the case study materials. Others comments were noted by the 
administrator during conversations with participants after the case study was completed. 
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Table 4- Credibility of Whistle-Blowing Report 
 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) {sample size} across treatment conditions
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
0.475 0.581 0.529
Circumvention (low) (0.155) (0.160) (0.165)
{20} {21} {41}
0.347 0.455 0.403
Exploitation (high) (0.135) (0.199) 0.177
{19} {20} {39}
Main Effect: 0.413 0.520 0.467
Report Source (0.189) (0.189) (0.181)
{39} {41} {80}
Report Source
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Publicly Traded 0.24 1 0.24 9.979 0.002 n / a
(PUB)
Report Source 0.264 1 0.264 10.968 0.001 H1a
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 0.254 1 0.254 10.526 0.002 H2a
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 1.04E-05 1 1.04E-05 0.000 0.983 H3a
Error 1.806 75 0.024
Adjusted R2 = .267  
 
credibility assessment. One of the participant’s justifications was: “An anonymous call 
has ground zero credibility, but I will investigate. A non-anonymous source is above 
ground zero.” Another participant indicated that: “Non-anonymous can also be less 
credible. Have had experience with employees posturing and creating a set up in order to 
sue the company.”  
 
     
 
  100
 
Differences in CAEs and Deputies 
 To investigate whether there were any differences in responses between the CAE 
participants and the Deputies, separate analyses were performed for each of these groups. 
Table 5, Panel A shows means, standard deviations, and sample size for the credibility 
assessment across treatment conditions for CAEs (n = 39) and Panel B shows these 
statistics for Deputies (n = 41). Table 6, Panels A and B show the results of the two 
ANCOVAs with CRED as the dependent variable and REPSOR, REPTHR, along with 
the interaction term, and the covariate PUB as independent variables. 
The ANCOVAs indicate that responses of CAEs were different from those of Deputies in 
some respects. For CAEs, REPSOR remained highly significant (F = 12.576, p < .001), 
but REPTHR became less significant (F = 3.316, p < .066). On the other hand, the  
Table 5 - Credibility of Whistle-Blowing Report, 
Means, CAEs versus Deputies 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) {Sample Size} Across Treatment Conditions 
Panel A: CAEs 
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
0.440 0.590 0.515
Circumvention (low) (0.117) (0.152) (0.153)
{10} {10} {20}
0.322 0.500 0.416
Exploitation (high) (0.130) (0.211) (0.195)
{9} {10} {19}
Main Effect: 0.384 0.545 0.467
Report Source (0.134) (0.185) (0.180)
{19} {20} {39}
Report Source
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Panel B: Deputies
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
0.510 0.573 0.543
Circumvention (low) (0.185) (0.174) (0.178)
{10} {11} {21}
0.370 0.410 0.390
Exploitation (high) (0.142) (0.185) (0.162)
{10} {10} {20}
Main Effect: 0.440 0.495 0.468
Report Source (0.176) (0.194) (0.185)
{20} {21} {41}
Report Source
 
Table 6 - Credibility of Whistle-Blowing Report, ANCOVA Results, 
CAEs versus Deputies 
Panel A: CAEs, (n = 39)
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Publicly Traded 0.154 1 0.154 7.355 0.010 n / a
(PUB)
Report Source 0.264 1 0.264 12.576 0.001 H1a
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 0.076 1 0.076 3.616 0.066 H2a
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 1.02E-05 1 1.02E-05 0.000 0.983 H3a
Error 0.714 34 0.021
Adjusted R2 = .349  
Panel B: Deputies, (n = 41)
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Publicly Traded 0.073 1 0.073 2.560 0.118 n / a
(PUB)
Report Source 0.042 1 0.042 1.467 0.234 H1a
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 0.198 1 0.198 6.923 0.012 H2a
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 3.55E-07 1 3.55E-07 0.000 0.997 H3a
Error 1.028 36 0.029
Adjusted R2 = .166  
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ANCOVA for the Deputy group showed REPSOR was insignificant (F = 1.467, p < 
.234) and REPTHR remained significant (F = 6.923, p < .012). The interaction term 
remained insignificant for both. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported for CAEs, but not for 
Deputies. Hypothesis 2a has strong support from the Deputy group and moderate support 
from the CAE group. 
Corroborating the outcome of the two ANCOVAs, a review of the mean 
credibility assessments gives further insight. Although the overall mean credibility 
assessment for Non-Anonymous reporters was greater than that for Anonymous reporters 
in both the CAE and Deputy groups, there was a larger difference between the two means 
for CAEs than for Deputies. CAEs in the Non-Anonymous/ Circumvention (NA/C) 
condition gave the highest mean rating (0.590), while CAEs in the Non-
Anonymous/Exploitation (NA/E) condition gave the second highest mean assessment 
(0.500). Deputies in the NA/C condition also gave the highest credibility assessments. In 
contrast to the CAE group, the second highest assessment for Deputies was given by 
those in the Anonymous/Circumvention (A/C) group. 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
Diagnostics for Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b were both tested with Resource Allocation (RESAL) as the 
dependent variable. As a preliminary step, regression analyses were conducted to test for 
the significance of demographic variables. Once again, the primary independent variables 
of REPSOR and REPTHR were included along with the following demographic 
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variables: CAE, Q20CPA, Q20CIA, Q20OTH, Q21EIA, Q21EEA, Q21ECA, Q22TEN, 
and PUB.  
Both the stepwise and enter variable entry methods were used. The stepwise 
method showed two significant covariates, CAE (p < .000), and Q20CPA (p < .026). The 
enter method showed CAE as most significant (p < .001) and Q20CPA also as somewhat 
significant (p < .088). REPSOR and REPTHR were insignificant in both of these models. 
The R2a for the stepwise model was .223 and the R2a for the enter model was .173. The 
VIFs for all variables in the enter model were greater than one, but less than two, 
indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern. 
 Influence diagnostics were then analyzed for the model including CAE and 
Q20CPA as covariates. Three cases had an R-Student statistic with an absolute value 
greater than two indicating these cases may be outliers. The highest was Case #48 with a 
value of -2.460 and the next highest was Case #25 with a value of -2.303. These two 
cases also exhibited the highest Cook’s Ds at .072 and .084 respectively. Case #48 had a 
COVRATIO lower than the benchmark (1 – 3p/n = .815) with a value of .771, which 
indicated a negative impact on the model. Case # 25 had a COVRATIO of .822. None of 
the cases had an unusual value for the HAT diagonal or for DFFITS. Although none of 
these cases was clearly an outlier, Case #25 and Case #48 were removed from the model 
due to the fact they had at least two unusual statistics. 
The regression analysis described above was conducted again with these two 
responses excluded from the data set (n = 79). CAE was significant at p < .000 and 
Q20CPA was significant at p < .008. REPSOR and REPTHR were insignificant. This 
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model had an R2a of .231. An ANCOVA with the 79 retained cases was run with 
REPSOR, REPTHR, their interaction, and CAE and Q20CPA as covariates. Both 
covariates were significant at p < .01. REPSOR and REPTHR remained insignificant as 
did their interaction. The R2a for this model was .238.  
 The primary variables of interest, REPSOR and REPTHR, remained statistically 
insignificant for all versions of the model. The interaction term remained insignificant as 
well. Accordingly, the choice of model did not appear to be critical to the testing of 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b. The model excluding Case #25 and Case #48 and retaining CAE 
and Q20CPA as covariates was selected for testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b. Levene’s test 
for equality of error variances for this model was insignificant at p < .885 and the R2a was 
.238. 
Tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
Hypothesis 1b states that CAEs will allocate fewer resources to investigating 
anonymous whistle-blowing reports than they will allocate to investigating non-
anonymous whistle-blowing reports. Table 7, Panel A shows means, standard deviations, 
and sample size for the resource allocation across treatment conditions. Panel B shows 
the results of an ANCOVA with RESAL as the dependent variable and REPSOR, 
REPTHR, and the interaction term as independent variables. CAE and Q20CPA were 
included as covariates. Although Panel A shows that, as predicted, the mean of resources 
allocated by those in the anonymous condition ($69,079) was less than the mean of 
resources allocated in the non-anonymous condition ($70,244), Panel B reveals that the 
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variable for REPSOR was insignificant (F = 0.366, p < .547). Consequently, Hypothesis 
1b is not supported. 
Table 7 - Resource Allocation 
 
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) {sample size} across treatment conditions
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
63,000 70,952 67,073
Circumvention (low) (26,577) (28,400) (24,277)
{20} {21} {41}
75,833 69,500 72,500
Exploitation (high) (29,568) (29,285) (29,195)
{20} {20} {38}
Main Effect: 69,079 70,244 69,684
Report Source (28,400) (28,481) (28,265)
{38} {41} {80}
Whistle-Blowing Source
 
 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Participant is CAE 9.133E9 1 9.133E9 15.000 0.000 n / a
(CAE)
Participant is CPA 4.442E9 1 4.442E9 7.296 0.009 n / a
(Q20CPA)
Report Source 2.226E8 1 2.226E8 0.366 0.547 H1b
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 7.684E8 1 7.684E8 1.262 0.265 H2b
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 9.924E8 1 9.924E8 1.630 0.206 H3b
Error 4.445E10 73 6.089E8
Adjusted R2 = .238  
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Hypothesis 2b predicts that CAEs who receive a whistle-blowing allegation that 
suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in 
internal controls (circumvention of internal controls) will allocate fewer (more) resources 
toward investigating the allegation. The results of the ANCOVA presented in Table 7, 
Panel B shows the variable for REPTHR was insignificant (F = 1.262, p < .265). The 
pattern of means in Panel A indicates that resource allocations were actually higher for 
wrongdoing allegedly accomplished by exploitation of weaknesses in internal controls 
($72,500) than for that allegedly accomplished by circumvention of internal controls 
($67,073); thus, Hypothesis 2b is not supported. 
Participant comments lend insight to these findings. With regard to resource 
allocation decisions, multiple CAE participants claimed they would spend “what ever it 
takes” to investigate the allegations and that “budget was not a consideration.” Additional 
comments were: “If there is a whistle-blowing activity there is no budget, you just do it!” 
and “If restatement is out there, budget is beside the point. There is an open check book.” 
With regard to the effect that the report’s credibility had on the resource allocation 
choice, representative comments were: “Regardless of thoughts of credibility, (I) must 
treat the report as valid until proven otherwise,” and also, “I may look at non-anonymous 
as more credible – wish all calls were non-anonymous because they are easier to 
investigate – but, I make every effort to be impartial and treat all reports as valid and 
worthy of investigation,” and “Circumvention of controls is on the higher end of 
credibility.” 
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Differences in CAEs and Deputies 
 The highly significant CAE covariate suggested that there may be distinct 
differences in the RESAL responses of the CAE participants when compared to the 
Deputy participants.  To explore these possibilities, separate analyses were conducted for 
each of these participant groups. Table 8, Panel A shows means, standard deviations, and 
sample size for the credibility assessment across treatment conditions for CAEs (n = 39) 
and Panel B shows these statistics for Deputies (n = 40). Table 9, Panels A and B show 
the results of the two ANCOVAs with RESAL as the dependent variable and REPSOR, 
REPTHR, along with the interaction term, and the covariate Q20CPA as independent 
variables. 
Table 8- Resource Allocation, Means, CAEs versus Deputies 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) {Sample Size} 
 Across Treatment Conditions 
 
Panel A: CAEs 
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
74,000 82,000 78,000
Circumvention (low) (27,568) (23,944) (25,464)
{10} {10} {20}
88,889 84,000 86,316
Exploitation (high) (22,048) (25,906) (23,620)
[9] {10} {19}
Main Effect: 81,053 83,000 82,051
Report Source (25,581) (24,301) (24,621)
{19} {20} {39}
Report Source
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Panel B: Deputies
Main Effect:
Reputation Threat Anonymous Non-Anonymous Reputation 
Threat
52,000 60,909 56,667
Circumvention (low) (21,499) (29,395) (25,707)
{10} {11}
62,778 55,000 58,684
Exploitation (high) (31,436) (25,927) (28,129)
{9} {10}
Main Effect: 57,105 58,095 57,625
Report Source (26,474) (27,271) (26,554)
{19} {21} {40}
Whistle-Blowing Source
 
Table 9 - Resource Allocation, ANCOVA Results, CAEs versus Deputies 
 
Panel A: CAEs, (n = 39)
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Participant is CPA 1.99E+09 1 1.99E+09 3.393 0.074 n / a
(Q20CPA)
Report Source 2.05E+08 1 2.05E+08 0.350 0.558 H1a
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 2.60E+08 1 2.60E+08 0.444 0.510 H2a
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 4.15E+08 1 4.15E+08 0.708 0.406 H3a
Error 1.99E+10 34 5.86E+08
Adjusted R2 = .033  
Panel B: Deputies (n = 40)
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Hypothesis
Participant is CPA 2.297E9 1 2.297E9 3.286 .078 n / a
(Q20CPA)
Report Source 4.893E7 1 4.893E7 0.070 0.793 H1b
(REPSOR)
Reputation Threat 4.663E8 1 4.663E8 0.667 0.420 H2b
(REPTHR)
RPTSOR X REPTHR 5.884E8 1 5.884E8 0.842 0.365 H3b
Error 2.446E10 35 6.988E8
Adjusted R2 = .009  
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The ANCOVAs indicated that REPSOR, REPTHR, and their interaction term 
remained insignificant for the individual participant groups. An examination of the mean 
dollars of resources allocated for the two groups revealed that CAEs in all four conditions 
allocated more resources to investigate the allegations than did Deputies. Both CAEs and 
Deputies in the NA/E condition allocated the most dollars and those in the A/C condition 
allocated the least. 
Like CAEs, many Deputies chose to write comments on their case study 
materials. Although many of the comments mirrored the opinions expressed by CAEs 
such as, “Due to the nature of the allegation, it should be investigated fully,” and, “(We) 
should not cut corners on investigating allegations of misconduct,” there were some that 
showed a different trend. Examples of these were: “Based on the allegation, I would not 
invest a lot of money” (this participant was in the A/E condition), and “I would definitely 
allocate more money if the source was non-anonymous.” Moreover, many of the 
Deputies that made statements about the importance of investigating allocated less the 
maximum $100,000. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
 The intended method of analysis for Hypotheses 3a and 3b was a planned contrast 
of differences in means. The necessary condition for these contrasts to be conducted was 
that the interaction term in the applicable ANCOVA had to be statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 3a: The difference in perceived credibility of a whistle-blowing allegation 
 between anonymous and non-anonymous reporting will be significantly 
 greater when the allegation suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by  
 the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in internal controls relative to 
 when the fraud was perpetrated by the circumvention of internal controls. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The difference in investigatory resource allocation between anonymous 
   and non-anonymous reporting will be significantly greater when the 
   allegation suggests that the fraud was perpetrated by the exploitation of 
   substantial weaknesses in internal controls relative to when the fraud 
   was perpetrated by the circumvention of internal controls. 
 
Hypothesis 3a focused on CRED as the dependent variable. Table 4, Panel B 
indicates an insignificant interaction term (F = 0.000, p < .983). Therefore, no further 
testing is warranted and Hypothesis 3a is not supported. Similarly, the test for Hypothesis 
3b is not appropriate because the interaction term in the ANCOVA with RESAL as the 
dependent variable is insignificant (F = 1.630, p < .206). This result is shown in Panel B 
of Table 7. Hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that perceived credibility would mediate the relationship 
between report source and the dollar amount of investigatory resources allocated. It also 
predicted that perceived credibility would mediate the relationship between reputation 
threat and the dollar amount of investigatory resources allocated. Because the relationship 
between both REPSOR and REPTHR and RESAL was shown to be insignificant, the test 
for Hypothesis 4 is not warranted. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Additional Analysis 
Debriefing Questions 
 The purpose of the debriefing questions was to provide additional insights into the 
judgment and decision making processes of CAEs. The means and standard deviations, 
by treatment condition, of the responses to each debriefing question (Questions 3 through 
 
     
 
 
  111
 
                                                
19)5 are displayed in Table 10. In addition, the results of planned contrasts comparing the 
means of responses of participants in the Circumvention condition to the means of the 
responses of participants in the Exploitation condition are also shown in Table 10.  
Questions 3, 7, and 13 specifically addressed credibility of anonymous versus 
non-anonymous whistle-blowers and reports. Consistent with the significance of 
REPTHR to the determination of the dependent variable CRED, the mean responses to 
Question 3 indicated that those in the Circumvention condition rated the credibility of the 
individual who made the whistle-blowing report significantly higher than did those in the 
Exploitation condition (F = 5.162, p < .026). These results suggest that participants did 
not distinguish between the credibility of the reporter and the credibility of the report 
itself. The means for each of the four conditions in Question 3 were identical or quite 
similar to those for CRED (see Table 4).  
Question 7 addressed the importance of the credibility of the whistle-blower in the 
participant’s decision to allocate resources. The participants in the Circumvention 
condition indicated that this factor was moderately important (mean responses were 3.55 
and 3.71; the scale indicated that a 4 was moderately important). Exploitation condition 
participants rated the credibility of the whistle-blower as less than moderately important; 
however, the difference in means was not significant (F = 1.248, p < .267). 
Question 13 asked participants whether anonymous or non-anonymous whistle-
blowing reports were generally more credible. Again, there was no significant difference 
in the means between the two REPTHR conditions (F = 0.162, p < .689). All participants
 
5 Questions 1 and 2 were manipulation check questions and are not, therefore, addressed here. 
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regarded non-anonymous reports as generally more credible, although not a great deal 
more credible. The 11 point scale had a midpoint of 0 indicating no difference. A positive 
score6 indicated that non-anonymous reports were more credible and mean scores ranged 
from 2.40 (A/C) to 1.40 (NA/C). One participant commented below Question 13: “Both 
can be credible for different reasons. Non-anonymous is more credible because they are 
staking their reputation on their report.”  
Question 9 was designed to measure credibility using different language. It asked 
participants to assess the probability that the whistle-blowing report was true. The 
patterns of means for the four treatment conditions for this question were very similar to 
those of Question 3 which referred to the credibility of the individual. Likewise, the 
difference in means between the Circumvention and Exploitation groups was significant 
(F = 4.997, p < .028); participants in the Circumvention conditions gave a higher 
probability. 
Following the results of the factor analysis, the responses to Question 3 and 
Question 9 were combined to create the variable CREDSC. As expected from the results 
of Question 3 and Question 9 individually, the difference in means between the 
Circumvention and Exploitation groups was significant (F = 6.923, p < .010). Participants 
in the Circumvention conditions had a higher mean CREDSC than those in the 
Exploitation conditions (see Table 11).
 
6 None of the response scales that were presented to participants in the debriefing questions showed 
negative signs. Responses on the left side of 0 were coded as negative and responses on the right side of 0 
were coded as positive. See Appendix for the exact formats that were presented to participants. 
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Three debriefing questions, 5, 11, and 12, addressed reputation threat issues. 
Question 5 inquired as to how the whistle-blowing report would effect “your reputation 
as the Chief Audit Executive.” Although the differences in means between the two 
Reputation Threat conditions were not significant (F = 0.470, p < 0.495), the 
Anonymous/Exploitation (A/E) group indicated the most negative reputation effect. 
Question 11 also addressed the effect of the report on “your reputation” and the results 
were quite similar to those of Question 5 (F = 0.084, p < 0.773). The A/E group, again, 
predicted the most negative effect. Question 12 asked the participant to consider the 
effect of the whistle-blowing report on the reputation of the internal audit department. A 
similar pattern of means was observed, however, the A/C group and the A/E group shared 
the same means and the position of most negative response. The difference in means was 
insignificant (F = 0.120, p < .730). 
As explained earlier, the REPUSC variable was created from the responses for 
Questions 5, 11, and 12 (see Table 3). A comparison of the means of REPUSC for the 
treatment groups is a convenient way to evaluate the overall Reputation construct (see 
Tale 11). The two groups in the Anonymous conditions indicated the highest mean 
Reputation Threat (A/E = - 1.98, A/C = -1.72). The participants in the NA/E condition 
recorded the lowest mean threat (-1.32) and the NA/C group was in the middle (-1.58). 
The highly insignificant difference in the means of the Circumvention and the 
Exploitation conditions (F = 0.000, p < 1.000) indicates that the case study Reputation 
Threat manipulation had no effect on perceived reputation threat of the participants. 
CAEs and Deputies were also analyzed separately for REPUSC means. Both sets of data 
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showed insignificant differences between the groups (CAEs, F = 0.151, p < 0.929; 
Deputies, F = 0.347, p < 0.559). 
Regarding the three reputation questions, two comments in particular add insight. 
One participant noted after Question 5 (effect on CAE’s reputation), “More important as 
to how I would react to the situation.” Another responded, “Will this effect the CAE’s 
reputation? Depends on whether the issue was in the audit plan. It could actually increase 
your reputation because you get in the spotlight for the investigation. It depends on a lot 
of issues.” 
The third construct that was addressed by the debriefing questions was perceived 
responsibility. This construct was measured by Questions 4 and 10. The responses to 
these two questions were also used to calculate the Responsibility Score variable 
(RESBSC). Question 4 asked the participant to rate internal audit’s responsibility for the 
alleged wrongdoing. The Exploitation condition participants had mean responses that 
indicated a significantly higher level of perceived internal audit responsibility (F = 
12.260, p < .001). The A/E condition had the highest mean (0.49) followed by the NA/E 
condition (0.40). The .50 response on the scale was labeled Moderately Responsible.  
Question 10 inquired about the participant’s level of perceived personal 
responsibility for the wrongdoing. These mean responses were similar to those of 
Question 4 with participants in the A/E condition recording the highest mean (0.46) 
followed by those in the NA/E condition (0.41). Again, the .50 response on the scale was 
labeled Moderately Responsible. The difference in means between the Exploitation 
condition participants and those in the Circumvention condition was significant (F = 
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8.192, p < .005). Overall, perceived responsibility can be evaluated by inspecting 
RESBSC. The Exploitation condition participants had mean responses that indicated a 
significantly higher level of perceived responsibility than the Circumvention condition 
participants (F = 13.149, p < .001).  
Even though the case manipulation for Reputation Threat did not affect 
participants’ perceived concern for their reputations, it clearly affected their perception of 
the level of departmental and personal responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing. One 
salient participant comment was, “More responsible for exploitation.” A participant who 
was in the NA/E condition and noted an 80% responsibility rating to Question 4 (internal 
audit responsibility) stated, “Management is responsible for control, but IA and CPA’s 
SOX process should help prevent.” In contrast, a participant in the NA/C condition who 
chose a 10% responsibility rating to Question 4 opined, “There is always audit risk that 
errors or control breakdowns may not be discovered. IA provides some reasonable 
assurance.” Another A/C respondent (with a 0% rating for Question 4) explained, “This 
is management’s responsibility.” 
Question 8 addressed the salience of an underlying accuracy goal by asking how 
important the possible justification of the participant’s decision to the audit committee 
was to his or her decision to allocate investigatory funds. Participants in all four 
conditions responded positively, however, all four means indicated that this criterion was 
less than moderately important. The difference in means between the Exploitation group 
and the Circumvention group was insignificant (F = 0.069, p < .793).  
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Question 7 (importance of credibility to the decision) and Question 8 loaded 
together to form the Accuracy component in the factor analysis. The combined responses 
were used to calculate ACCRSC (see Table 11). The combined means of the 
Circumvention group were greater than the combined means of the Exploitation group, 
nevertheless, the difference in means was statistically insignificant (F = 0.692, p < 
0.408). 
Questions 14 and 16 inquired about the participant’s general impression of 
anonymous and non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports. Participants in all four 
treatment conditions claimed that anonymous reports were more difficult to investigate 
than non-anonymous reports (Question 14). Participants in the two Anonymous 
conditions rated anonymous reports as more difficult than did those in the Non-
anonymous conditions. The difference in means between the Circumvention group 
responses and those of the Exploitation group was statistically insignificant (F = 0.195, p 
< 0.660). Similarly, all four groups indicated that anonymous whistle-blowing reports 
were useful for detecting and preventing fraud (Question 16). Again, there was no 
difference in means (F = 0.075, p < .785). Two participants wrote notes after Question 
16. “In theory, having the process should be very helpful, in practice, not often used. 
Opposite concern, people start using the hot line as a way of obtaining settlement for 
personal gain,” and “The knowledge that a vehicle exists to report inappropriate activities 
provides somewhat of a sentinel effect.” 
Questions 15 and 17 addressed the probability that external auditors and internal 
auditors would not detect earnings management. More specifically, Question 15 asked 
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the likelihood that external auditors would issue a clean opinion when earnings had been 
significantly manipulated. Mean responses ranged from 0.40 to 0.51. The .50 anchor on 
the response scale was Moderately Likely. This indicates that, on average, all participants 
thought that such an occurrence was realistic, though not very likely. The difference in 
means test between the Exploitation and the Circumvention groups was insignificant (F = 
0.002, p < .965). Two pertinent comments were: “World Com and Enron should show 
that it can happen. Even good audit procedures may not detect,” and “My company 
experienced a restatement after a material weakness was discovered. The external audit 
clean opinion is not that telling.” 
Question 17 was similar to Question 15; however, its focus was detection by the 
internal audit function. Both groups in the Circumvention condition responded that 
failure to detect significant manipulation of earnings was more than Moderately Probable 
with the mean of A/C responses at 0.52 and the mean of NA/C responses at 0.57. The 
means of both Exploitation groups were less than 0.50 (A/E = 0.46 and NA/E = 0.47). 
The resulting difference in the means between the Exploitation groups and the 
Circumvention groups was moderately significant (F = 3.052, p < .085).  
Question 18 asked participants whether the anonymous employee described in a 
new scenario was trying to discredit management or whether the employee was aware of 
a wrongdoing (see Appendix, Question 18). Differences in means between the 
Exploitation groups and the Circumvention groups were insignificant (F = 2.588, p < 
.112). The next question (Question 19) asked participants to rate the credibility of the 
whistle-blower in the new mini case. Similar to previous credibility related responses, the 
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Circumvention groups rated the employee as significantly more credible than those in the 
Exploitation groups (F = 5.014, p < .028). The means and pattern of means for all four 
groups were similar to those for Question 3 (credibility of the whistle-blower in the 
original case). 
Finally, Question 6 asked participants to indicate their assumption about the level 
of the position of the whistle-blower. The means presented in Table 10 were calculated 
after the responses of the 15 participants that indicated No Specific Impression were 
removed. Of these 15, five were in the non-anonymous condition and 10 were in the 
anonymous condition. A response of 2 indicated that the whistle-blower was assumed to 
be Mid-Level Management and a response of 3 indicated that he or she was assumed to be 
Staff. Even though the means are similar, the Exploitation groups perceived the whistle-
blower to be in a lower position than did the Circumvention groups. Four respondents 
indicated that they envisioned the whistle-blower to be Senior Management and none 
chose Lower Level/Hourly as their response. No test of difference in means was 
conducted for this question as the responses were nominal. 
In summary, the three credibility related debriefing questions (Questions 3, 9, and 
19) showed a significant difference in means between the Exploitation groups and the 
Circumvention groups. In all cases the participants in the Circumvention groups rated the 
credibility of the whistle-blowing report and the whistle-blower higher than did those in 
the Exploitation groups. The two questions addressing responsibility and the related 
RESBSC also showed a significant difference in means between the Exploitation groups 
and the Circumvention groups with the Exploitation groups perceiving the greatest level 
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of responsibility. Finally, the insignificance of the differences in means for the reputation 
questions and REPUSC is an important finding as it corroborates the lack of support for 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b.  
Actual Experience with Anonymous Reporting 
 Three questions inquired about participants’ actual experiences with anonymous 
whistle-blowing reports. Question 24 asked what percentage of reports they had received 
were anonymous and Question 25 asked what percentage of the anonymous reports they 
investigated was valid. Question 26 asked what percentage of these reports the 
respondent believed to be valid. For this analysis means were calculated separately for 
CAEs and Deputies. Twenty-seven of the 41 Deputies did not respond to these questions 
or indicated that they had not received any anonymous reports. This was also true for 12 
of the 40 CAEs. Means and standard deviations of the responses are presented in Table 
12. 
Table 12 - Actual Experience with Anonymous Whistle-Blowing Reports 
 
Mean (standard deviation) {sample size} 
CAEs Deputies Total
% Anonymous Reports 0.674 0.625 0.658
Received (0.296) (0.256) (0.281)
(Q 24) {28} {14} {42}
% of Anonymous Reports 0.248 0.346 0.281
Valid (0.206) (0.246) (0.222)
(Q 25) {28} {14} {42}
% of Anonymous Reports 0.307 0.405 0.340
Believed Valid (0.200) (0.280) (0.231)
(Q 26) {28} {14} {42}  
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Both CAEs and Deputies indicated that over 60% of whistle-blowing reports that they 
had received had been anonymous (CAE = 67.4%, Deputies = 62.5%). However, CAEs 
noted that only 25% of these anonymous reports investigated had been valid compared to 
Deputies’ 35%. Both CAEs and Deputies believed that a higher percentage of anonymous 
reports were valid than their actual experience indicated (CAEs = 30.7%, Deputies 
40.5%).  
Actual Reporting Relationships 
 Question 23 asked participants to indicate which individuals or departments were 
responsible for investigating whistle-blowing reports in their organizations. Eighty of the 
81 participants answered these questions. The results are detailed in Table 13, Panel A. 
The most frequent response was that internal audit was responsible or shared 
responsibility for investigating whistle-blowing reports (41 or 50.6% of respondents). 
CAEs listed this choice more frequently than did Deputies (CAEs = 55.0%, Deputies = 
47.5%). The general counsel or legal department was chosen by 33 (40.7%) of all 
participants and, again, CAEs listed this choice more frequently than did Deputies (CAEs 
= 50.0%, Deputies = 32.5%). The audit committee was indicated by 18 (22.2%) of 
participants (CAEs = 32.5%, Deputies = 12.5%). Twenty-four respondents indicated that 
some other individual or department within their companies was at least partially 
responsible for whistle-blowing report investigation (both CAEs and Deputies = 30.0%).  
 Question 27 asked participants to indicate who had responsibility for evaluating 
their performance. Question 28 asked participants to indicate who had responsibility for 
approving internal audit’s budget. Responses from Deputies were ignored for this  
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Table 13 - Reporting Relationships 
 
Panel A: Primary Responsibility for Investigating Whistle-blowing Reports
CAE Deputy Total
(#, %) (#, %) (#, %)
Internal Audit 22, 55.0% 19, 47.5% 41, 50.6%
Audit Committee 13, 32.5% 5, 12.5% 18, 22.2%
General Counsel / 
Legal 20, 50.0% 13, 32.5% 33, 40.7%
Other 12, 30.0% 12, 30.0% 24, 29.6%
(N = 40) (N = 40) (N = 80)
Note: Respondents indicated all that applied. In many cases 
responsibility for investigating was shared among two or more entities.  
Panel B: Responsibility for Evaluating Performance and Approving Budgets
Publicly 
Traded
Not Publcily 
Traded
Publicly 
Traded
Not Publcily 
Traded
(#, %) (#, %) (#, %) (#, %)
Senior Management is 
Solely Responsible
2, 6.2% 2, 28.6% 4, 12.5% 2, 28.6%
Senior Management is 
Primarily Responsible
13, 40.6% 1, 14.3% 13, 40.6% 4, 57.1%
Audit Committee is 
Solely Responsible
0, 0% 0, 0% 0, 0% 0, 0%
Audit Committee is 
Primarily Responsible
6, 18.8% 1, 14.3% 7, 21.9% 1, 14.3%
Senior Management and 
Audit Committee Have 
Equivalent Responsibility
11, 34.4% 3, 42.9% 8, 25.0% 0, 0%
(N = 32) (N = 7) (N = 32) (N = 7)
Only responses of CAEs are included.
Performance Evaluation
Internal Audit Budget 
Approval
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analysis because Deputies are most likely to be evaluated by their direct supervisors, the 
CAEs. However, the data was split between publicly traded and non-publicly traded 
organizations to add further insight. These data are shown in Table 13, Panel B. CAEs in 
publicly traded companies (PT) were most frequently primarily evaluated by senior 
management with some input from the audit committee (40.6%). The next most frequent 
response was that senior management and the audit committee had equivalent 
responsibility for evaluations (34.4%). The third most frequent response (18.8%) was that 
the audit committee was primarily responsible and the fourth most frequent (6.2%) was 
that senior management was solely responsible. The highest frequency (42.9%) of CAEs 
in non-publicly traded companies (NP) reported that senior management and the audit 
committee had equivalent responsibility for evaluations. Senior Management is Solely 
Responsible was the response in 28.6% of the NP organizations. One respondent (14.3%) 
indicated that his or her evaluation was primarily the responsibility of senior management 
and one (14.3%) indicated that his or her evaluation was primarily the responsibility of 
the audit committee.  None of the CAEs in either the PT or the NP organizations 
indicated that the audit committee had sole responsibility. 
The pattern of responses to Question 28 regarding internal audit budget approval 
was the same for PT CAEs as were the responses to the evaluation question. Again, 
Senior Management is Primarily Responsible was the most frequent response (40.6%), 
and Senior Management is Solely Responsible was least frequent (12.5%). No 
participants indicated that the audit committee was solely responsible. The majority of 
NP CAEs (57.1%) reported that senior management was primarily responsible for 
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internal audit budget approval. The next most frequent response was that senior 
management was solely responsible (28.6%). One (14.3%) NP CAE reported that the 
audit committee was primarily responsible. None of the NP CAEs reported that senior 
management and the audit committee shared the responsibility equally or that the audit 
committee was solely responsible. 
In summary, senior management was either solely or primarily responsible for PT 
CAE evaluations in 46.8% of participants’ organizations, and they were solely or 
primarily responsible for budget approval in 43.1% of these organizations. The audit 
committee had primary responsibility for evaluations in only 18.8% of PT companies and 
primary budget approval authority for internal audit in 21.9%. This compares to senior 
management being either solely or primarily responsible for CAE evaluations in 42.9% 
of NP organizations and for budget approval in 85.7% of NP organizations.  
Motivated Reasoning Influences 
Accuracy Goals 
 According to Kunda (1990) individuals are most likely to be influenced by 
accuracy goals when they expect to justify their decision, expect the decision to be made 
public, or anticipate some other type of evaluation. Tyszka (1998) described an accuracy 
goal as a focus on completeness and reliability of the evaluation process. The mean 
responses to Question 8 that address the importance of the need to justify a decision to 
the audit committee in all four treatment conditions were less than Moderately Important 
and the difference in means was insignificant. However, it is possible that CAEs were 
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more influenced by their sense of personal and professional accountability for the 
possible wrongdoing than by accountability to specific outside parties.  
The RESBSC mean responses of participants in the Exploitation conditions were 
significantly higher than for those in the Circumvention conditions. The case study 
informed the participant that the internal audit function had evaluated internal controls 
and reported to management that no material weaknesses in internal controls were 
detected. It is reasonable that the participant would perceive a greater level of 
responsibility if an evaluation conducted by his or her department turned out to be flawed 
or inadequate. Participants in the Exploitation conditions allocated more funds to 
investigate the alleged wrongdoing than did those in the Circumvention conditions. 
Participants in the A/E condition allocated more funds, on average, to 
investigating the alleged wrongdoing than did participants in any other condition. This is 
especially interesting because participants in the A/E condition also assessed the 
credibility of the whistle-blowing report at the lowest level of all conditions. Perhaps this 
resource allocation decision reflects the combination of felt responsibility and the 
realization that anonymous reports are generally more difficult and, therefore, more 
expensive, to investigate (see Table 10, debriefing Question 14). These motivations fit 
Tyszka’s (1998) notion of an accuracy goal influence and corroborate the suggestion of  
Russo et al. (2000) that internal auditors have a high degree of accountability ingrained in 
their decision making due to normal responsibilities and training. Furthermore, an 
accuracy motivation is in keeping with the IIA’s Code of Ethics for internal auditors to 
uphold the principles of integrity, objectivity, and competency.  
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Directional Goals 
Directional goals manifest in one or more ways. Among these are biased beliefs 
about self and/or others, biased use of statistical heuristics, and biased information 
processing (Kunda 1990). The separate ANCOVAs for credibility assessment indicate 
that while CAEs based their credibility assessments primarily on the anonymous or non-
anonymous status of the whistle-blower, Deputies were significantly influenced by the 
REPTHR condition. Deputies in both the NA/C and the A/C conditions gave higher 
credibility assessments to the whistle-blowing report than did Deputies in the NA/E or 
A/E conditions. This indicates possible biased beliefs about non-anonymous whistle-
blowers because they made a less favorable report (exploitation) for which the Deputy 
felt greater responsibility. 
Biased information processing can become apparent in the evaluation of new 
information. Individuals with directional goals may judge new information as valid only 
when it matches their predetermined outcome. The mini case presented before Questions 
18 and 19 was designed to examine this aspect of motivated reasoning. Question 18 
asked participants to evaluate the motives of the whistle-blower in the mini case (from 
the extreme of “employees are trying to discredit management” to “employee is aware of 
manipulation”) and Question 19 asked them to rate the whistle-blower’s credibility. The 
responses to Question 18 were originally coded for analysis7 with the extreme on the 
                                                 
7 The response scale presented to participants did not contain negative signs. For the purposes of analysis, 
responses on the left side of 0 were coded as negative and responses on the right side of 0 were coded as 
positive. See Appendix, Question 18 for the exact format that was presented to participants. 
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discredit side as -5 and the extreme on the aware side as +5. The 0 response was anchored 
as “I Have No Opinion.” The means in all four conditions were between -1 and +1 
indicating that, on average, participants did not have a strong opinion. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that the participants in the A/E condition had the most unfavorable view of 
the whistle-blower’s motivation with a mean response of -0.80 compared to the other 
three that were between -0.45 and +0.43. The NA/C group gave the only positive mean 
response (0.43). This indicates that respondents in the A/E condition were least trusting 
of this new report by an anonymous employee. 
Tests of differences in means for paired samples were conducted to compare 
participants’ credibility assessments of the whistle-blowing report in the original case 
study to their responses for Questions 18 and 19. Question 18 was recoded so that the 
scales of all three of these questions were compatible. These tests were insignificant for 
CAEs and Deputies in both the Exploitation and Circumvention groups for the first pair 
(CRED and Q18). For the second pair (CRED and Q19), CAEs showed insignificant 
differences for both Exploitation and Circumvention groups and Deputies showed a 
significant result for the Circumvention group (t = 2.307, p < .032) and an insignificant 
result for the Exploitation group. These results indicated evidence of participants’ 
evaluating new information in such a way as to make it agree with prior decisions.  
Biased processing of information includes the tendency to distort memory of prior 
probabilities. Participants were asked about their actual experiences with the validity of 
anonymous whistle-blowing reports (see Table 12). Tests of differences in means for 
paired samples were conducted to compare participants’ credibility assessments of the 
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whistle-blowing report in the case study to their responses for Question 25 
(Approximately what percentage of the anonymous whistle-blowing reports that you have 
investigated have been valid?) and for Question 26 (Approximately what percentage of 
the anonymous whistle-blowing reports at your organization do you believe to be valid?). 
The difference in means for CAEs was significant between the first pair (CRED and Q25) 
for participants in both the Circumvention (t = 2.994, p < .010) and the Exploitation 
conditions (t = 4.929, p < .000). Likewise, the difference in means for CAEs was 
significant between the second pair (CRED and Q26) for both groups (Circumvention, t = 
3.176, p < .007; Exploitation, t = 3.870, p < .002). These results indicate that CAEs’ 
credibility assessments for the whistle-blowing report in the case study did not 
significantly influence the reports of their actual experience. 
In contrast, the paired samples tests for differences in means revealed a somewhat 
different outcome for the Deputies. The difference in means for Deputies was 
insignificant between the first pair (CRED and Q25) for participants in both the 
Circumvention (t = 2.484, p < .056) and the Exploitation conditions (t = 1.643, p < .139). 
The difference in means for Deputies was moderately significant between the second pair 
(CRED and Q26) for the Circumvention group (t = 2.697, p < .043), but distinctly 
insignificant for those in the Exploitation group (t = 0.045, p < .965). These results 
indicated that Deputies may have revised prior probabilities to agree with their current, 
case study-related assessments. As indicated in Table 12, 28 CAEs and 14 Deputies 
responded to Questions 25 and 26. Consequently, the results must be interpreted in light 
of these relatively small sample sizes. 
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Comparison of CAE Study Results to Those of Audit Committee Member Study 
 The current experimental case study was adapted from Hunton and Rose (2008) 
which examined audit committee members’ judgments regarding the credibility of 
anonymous versus non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports and investigatory resource 
allocations in the presence of two levels of reputation threat. The participants in the 
Hunton and Rose (2008) study were all audit committee members (ACMs) with mean 
business experience of 23 years. Seventy-five percent of the participants were considered 
to be the financial expert on their respective audit committees. Similar to CAEs in the 
current study, ACMs assessed non-anonymous whistle-blowing reports to be more 
credible than those from anonymous sources. Both CAEs and ACMs in the high 
reputation threat conditions made lower credibility assessments.  
On the other hand, the resource allocation decisions among CAEs and ACMs 
were markedly different. Hunton and Rose (2008) found that resource allocation 
decisions of ACMs were significantly influenced by both report source and reputation 
threat. They concluded that ACMs might fail to sufficiently investigate allegations of 
wrongdoing received through anonymous whistle-blowing channels and that a high 
reputation threat condition may exacerbate this shortcoming. The current study indicates 
that CAEs are not significantly influenced by either the nature of the report source or by a 
reputation threat when making investigatory resource allocation decisions. 
Three questions focusing on the nature of anonymous reports versus non-
anonymous reports were either identical or very similar in the current and the former 
study. Accordingly, comparisons of the responses to these questions provide additional 
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insights to the similarities and differences in the two groups. Question 13 in the current 
study was identical to a question in the audit committee study, “In general, what type of 
whistle-blowing report do you believe is more credible, anonymous or non-anonymous?” 
The scales for the two questions were also identical (-5 Anonymous Are More Credible, 
0 No Difference in Credibility, +5 Non-Anonymous Are More Credible). Whereas the 
tests of differences in means between reputation threat groups were insignificant for both 
studies, ACMs rated non-anonymous reports to be much more credible when compared 
to anonymous reports than did CAEs. The comparative means in each of the four 
conditions were: (CAE vs. ACM) A/C, 2.40 vs. 3.81; NA/C, 1.40 vs. 3.75; A/E, 1.70 vs. 
3.86; and NA/E, 1.65 vs. 4.00.  
Question 14 was also identical to a question posed to ACMs, “In general, what 
type of whistle-blowing report do you believe is more difficult to investigate, anonymous 
or non-anonymous?” Again, the scales were the same (-5 Anonymous Are More 
Difficult, 0 No Difference in Difficulty, +5 Non-Anonymous Are More Difficult). The 
tests for differences between means of the two reputation threat groups were, once again, 
insignificant for both studies. Once again, CAEs and ACMs differed in their opinions; 
CAEs rated anonymous reports to be much more difficult to investigate than did ACMs.  
The comparative means in each of the four conditions were: (CAE vs. ACM) A/C, -3.70 
vs. -0.48; NA/C, -2.70 vs. -0.25; A/E, -3.00 vs. -0.45; and NA/E, -3.00 vs. 0.00.  
Finally, Question 16 in the current study asked, “In general, do you believe that 
anonymous whistle-blowing reports are useful for detecting and preventing financial 
statement fraud?” The question put to the ACMs was slightly different, but also focused 
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on the usefulness of anonymous reports, “In general, do you believe that anonymous 
whistle-blowing reports are useful to the board of directors?” The scales were the same (-
5 Not Useful at All, 0 Indifferent, +5 Very Useful). The comparative means in each of the 
four conditions were: (CAE vs. ACM) A/C, 2.10 vs. -2.90; NA/C, 2.75 vs. -2.70; A/E, 
2.75 vs. -3.18; and NA/E, 2.35 vs. -2.40.  
In summary, CAEs judged anonymous reports to be more credible, more difficult 
to investigate, and more useful than did ACMs. Although these two studies contain some 
notable differences, the responses of CAEs compared to ACMs may add understanding to 
how these two groups approach judgment and decision making in anonymous whistle-
blowing situations. The difference in findings points to possible incongruence in attitudes 
and highlights a potential conflict in corporate governance decisions. Several participant 
comments from CAEs indicated that they would obtain as much funding as needed from 
the audit committee to investigate the allegations of wrongdoing. The results of the 
Hunton and Rose (2008) study suggest that the check book may not be completely open, 
especially for whistle-blowing reports received from anonymous sources.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
  
The whistle-blowing related provisions of SOX focus on the provision of 
anonymous channels for the reporting of accounting irregularities and fraud. Research 
verifies that anonymous whistle-blowers are viewed as less credible than non-anonymous 
reporters. A primary factor in the effectiveness of anonymous whistle-blowing is the 
reaction of the complaint recipient. The purpose of this study was to examine CAEs’ 
judgments and decisions related to anonymous and non-anonymous whistle-blowing 
reports in which the alleged wrongdoing was perpetrated in different manners that could 
create higher or lower levels of reputation threat.   
 Results indicate that CAEs judged anonymous whistle-blowing allegations as well 
as anonymous whistle-blowers to be less credible than those that are non-anonymous. 
CAEs also judged whistle-blowing reports that suggested wrongdoing was perpetrated by 
the exploitation of substantial weaknesses in previously evaluated internal controls to be 
less credible than those which reported that the alleged wrongdoing was accomplished by 
the circumvention of internal controls. However, neither the report source (anonymous or 
non-anonymous) nor the alleged method of wrongdoing appeared to influence CAEs’ 
allocation of resources to investigate.  
 Debriefing questions indicated that CAEs did not perceive either the exploitation 
of substantial weaknesses in internal controls to be a greater threat to their reputation than 
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the circumvention of internal controls. Nevertheless, CAEs perceived significantly 
greater responsibility for wrongdoing perpetrated through an exploitation of substantial 
weaknesses compared to that accomplished by a circumvention of internal controls. 
Regardless of report source credibility, perceived reputation threat, or felt responsibility 
CAEs’ resource allocation decisions consistently demonstrated a determination to 
thoroughly investigate the allegations of wrongdoing and uncover the truth.  
 Although they expressed similar choices in many instances, findings suggest that 
Deputies are not adequate substitutes for CAEs in judgments and decisions of the type 
addressed in this study. While CAEs based their assessments of the credibility of whistle-
blowing allegations primarily on the type of source, anonymous or non-anonymous, 
Deputies were more influenced by the content of the report. Deputies assigned 
significantly less credibility to reports that were incongruent with prior beliefs that their 
thorough evaluation of internal controls would have identified such problems or flaws. 
Deputies were also more likely to revise their memories of prior related events than were 
CAEs. This lends additional support to the implication that Deputies may be more 
susceptible to the influence of directional goals than are CAEs. Moreover, Deputies 
allocated significantly fewer resources to the investigation of wrongdoing than did CAEs. 
This may be due to their perception that budget constraints were absolute and that senior 
management or the audit committee would not provide additional funds if needed. 
Alternatively, this outcome could be due to Deputies’ inexperience with the importance 
or the cost of such investigations. 
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 This study contributes to the current literature by exploring judgment and decision 
making of an important but under represented group in accounting research, CAEs. The 
design of this study as a controlled experiment increases internal validity and allows 
cause and effect relationships to be inferred from the findings. External validity is 
maximized by having participants who are actual CAEs and Deputies from primarily 
large publicly traded companies. The case represented a real-world scenario that CAEs 
have faced or are likely to face. One CAE commented, “This case study represents a real-
world happening. I have received anonymous and non-anonymous financial fraud 
allegations. Cost was no issue in investigating.” Furthermore, over half of the CAEs 
participating reported that they have responsibility or shared responsibility for 
investigating whistle-blowing reports. This underscores the importance of the 
understanding of judgment and decision making in this area. 
 The comparison and contrast of CAE and Deputy judgments and decision making 
also contribute to the extant research. CAEs and Deputies in this study had similar years 
of experience, professional credentials, and tenure. However, there appeared to be 
differences in processes of decision making that suggest Deputies cannot immediately 
substitute for CAEs. This is informative for CAEs who wish to provide Deputies with 
learning opportunities that will enhance their ability to make high level decisions. This 
study indicates that more exposure to decision processes that require interaction with 
audit committees may be appropriate. 
 Both internal audit functions and audit committees are important bodies within 
the corporate governance structure. The results of the current study, when contrasted with 
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Hunton and Rose (2008), suggest that CAEs and ACMs may approach whistle-blowing 
reports, especially those from anonymous reporters, differently. In this particular scenario 
CAEs who were internal to the organization and considered as a part of management 
appeared to be quite intentional in their duties as sentinels. On the other hand, the prior 
study indicated that ACMs who are charged with being overseers of the whistle-blowing 
process may not be as diligent. This insight could prove especially valuable for CAEs 
who depend on audit committee funding for the investigation of such whistle-blowing 
allegations.  
 Experimental studies have in common the limitation of generalizability. While a 
concerted effort was made to increase external validity, this case study is still not a real-
world experience and it lacks real-world effects such as influence of relationships and 
consequences of decision making. In addition, the lack of significance of reputation threat 
manipulations could be affected by the small sample size and resulting lack of statistical 
power. 
 This case study employed a financial statement restatement scenario to heighten 
the salience of the importance of the allegations of possible earnings management. 
Comments from participants showed that they judged the situation to be of crucial 
importance. It is possible that the critical nature of the situation overpowered any 
tendency for CAEs to be influenced by directional goals. Future research could 
investigate the influence of pre-decision bias and motivated reasoning in important, but 
less critical and/or less visible scenarios. 
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 This study spotlighted financial reporting issues and financial statement fraud. 
Comments by two Deputies indicated that their departments were more focused on 
operational issues. Moreover, Pryal (2008) predicts that SOX compliance will no longer 
be the primary focus of internal audit functions. Future research could explore internal 
auditors’ judgment and decision making in roles that are more operational in nature. In 
addition, similarities and differences in CAE and Deputy responses can be examined to 
add insight to how Deputies might progress to become more competent at the CAE level. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
This questionnaire is part of a study designed to investigate the decisions and 
perceptions of chief audit executives (i.e., heads of internal audit functions).  Please 
analyze the information provided in the following pages and provide your 
judgments as you would in the normal course of business. The amount of 
information presented is limited. Although you will not have all of the information 
you would typically have at your disposal, it is important that you make your 
judgments to the best of your abilities given the limited information set.  
 
Your responses are completely confidential and cannot be traced to you or your 
company. 
 
Thank you for your help. 
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PART I 
When reading the case materials and responding to the case questions please make the 
following assumptions: 
Assume that you currently serve as the Chief Audit Executive (that is, head of the internal audit 
function) for BioMeasure, Inc.   
Assume that the internal audit function evaluated BioMeasure’s internal controls during 2006, 
and internal audit reported to management and the audit committee that no material internal 
control weaknesses were detected. 
Assume that it is now December 2007, and the 2006 financial statements have been audited and 
publicly released. 
Background  
BioMeasure is a publicly traded company in the biotechnology industry that provides data 
collection services to pharmaceutical companies and operates in the western states of the United 
States. BioMeasure has been audited by the same Big 4 accounting firm for the preceding five 
years. BioMeasure’s external auditor has always issued standard, unqualified (i.e., clean) audit 
reports. The internal audit function is not outsourced, and it reports functionally to the audit 
committee and administratively to senior executives. 
 
Following the guidelines set forth by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, BioMeasure recently 
implemented a new whistle-blowing system that allows employees to report problems through 
anonymous or non-anonymous reporting channels.  During your tenure as the Chief Audit 
Executive no significant financial frauds or illegal activities have been identified through any 
whistle-blowing reporting channels. 
Whistle-Blowing Report 
However, one report was received in December 2007 through the new whistle-blowing system.  
The report is summarized below: 
 
An anonymous [A non-anonymous] source, the identity of whom you do not [do] know, has 
filed a report alleging that senior managers have been managing earnings in order to earn 
their bonuses, and the earnings management resulted in a material overstatement of 2006 
revenue.  The allegation further states that the managers increased reported earnings by 
exploiting substantial weaknesses in internal controls [circumventing internal controls]. 
 
You have determined that should the allegation be true, a restatement of 2006 revenue would be 
necessary.   
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Case Questions: 
 
1) Based only on the information presented on the preceding pages, what is your 
assessment of the credibility of the whistle-blowing report?  Please circle one of the 
percentages on the scale below to indicate your assessment. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not 
Credible 
at All 
    
 
Moderately 
Credible 
    
 
Completely 
Credible 
 
2) When budgeting for potential whistle-blowing investigation expenses for 2007, it was 
assumed that there could be as many as two significant reports and that each investigation 
would cost approximately $50,000, for a total budget of $100,000. Assume that you still 
have $100,000 remaining in your 2007 budget and that no other whistle-blowing reports 
will be investigated this year. Any funds that you do not use to investigate the whistle-
blowing report will carry forward to your 2008 general budget. The budget for your 
department has always been tight and you have important projects for 2008 that will not 
be fully funded. Based only on the information presented on the preceding pages, indicate 
the dollar amount of the 2007 whistle-blowing budget that you would allocate toward 
investigating this whistle-blowing report. Please enter the amount on the line below: 
$_______________________________  
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 Part II 
 
1. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding the type of 
whistle-blowing report in question? (check one) 
  
_____ The report was received from an anonymous source, the identity of whom you did 
not know. 
 
_____ The report was received from a non-anonymous source the identity of whom you 
did know. 
. 
2. For the case you completed, what was your assumption regarding the alleged 
management activities? (check one) 
  
_____ The allegation stated that the managers have increased reported earnings by 
circumventing internal controls. 
 
_____ The allegation stated that the managers have increased reported earnings by 
           exploiting substantial weaknesses in internal controls. 
3. Based only on the information presented in the case, what is your assessment of 
the credibility of the individual who made the whistle-blowing report? (circle the 
number that best represents your response)   
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not 
Credible 
at All 
    
 
Moderately 
Credible 
    
 
Completely 
Credible 
 
 
4. Should the allegation be true, what level of responsibility do you believe internal 
audit has for the wrongdoing? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not at All 
Responsible 
    
 
Moderately 
Responsible 
    
 
Extremely 
Responsible 
 
5. If an investigation reveals that the allegation is true, how do you believe that the 
whistle-blowing report could affect your reputation as the Chief Audit Executive? 
  
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Very 
Negative 
Effect 
    
 
No 
Effect 
    
 
Very 
Positive 
Effect 
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6. Circle the answer that best describes the position you believe the whistle-blower 
held in the case you just completed. The position of the whistle-blower is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Senior 
Management 
 
Mid Level 
Management 
 
Staff 
 
Lower Level/ Hourly 
 
No Specific 
Impression 
 
7. How important was the credibility of the whistle-blower in your decision to 
allocate resources to the investigation of the whistle-blowing report?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Not At All 
Important 
  
 
Moderately 
Important 
   Very Important 
 
8. How important was the possibility that you would have to justify your decision to 
the audit committee when you made your budget allocation decision? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Not At All 
Important 
  
 
Moderately 
Important 
   Very Important 
 
 
9. What is the probability that the whistle-blowing report is true?  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
No 
Possibility 
That It Is 
True 
    I Am Undecided     
I Am 
Certain 
That It 
Is True 
 
10. Would you feel any degree of personal responsibility for the earnings 
management should the allegation be true?    
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not at All 
Responsible 
    
 
Moderately 
Responsible 
    
 
Completely 
Responsible 
 
 
11. For the case you just completed, how do you believe that the whistle-blowing 
report could affect your reputation if an investigation reveals that the allegation is 
true?  
  
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Very 
Negative 
Effect 
    No Effect     
Very 
Positive 
Effect 
 
     
 
  155
 
12. How do you believe the whistle-blowing report could affect the internal audit 
function’s reputation if an investigation reveals that the allegation is true? 
 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Very 
Negative 
Effect 
    No Effect     
Very 
Positive 
Effect 
 
13. In general, what type of whistle-blowing report do you believe is more credible, 
anonymous or non-anonymous? 
 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Anonymous 
Are More 
Credible 
    
No 
Difference in 
Credibility 
    
Non-
Anonymous 
Are More 
Credible 
 
 
14. In general, what type of whistle-blowing report do you believe is more difficult to 
investigate, anonymous or non-anonymous? 
 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Anonymous 
Are More 
Difficult 
    
 
No 
Difference in 
Difficulty 
    
 
Non-
Anonymous 
Are More 
Difficult 
 
15. In general, do you believe that it is likely for external auditors to issue a clean 
audit opinion when management has been manipulating earnings to the extent that 
a restatement is necessary? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not Likely at 
All 
    
 
Moderately 
Likely 
     Very Likely 
 
 
16. In general, do you believe that anonymous whistle-blowing reports are useful for 
detecting and preventing financial statement fraud? 
 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Not 
Useful at 
All 
    Indifferent     
 
Very 
Useful 
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17. In general, what is the probability that internal audit would fail to detect 
significant manipulation of earnings by senior management?  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not Probable 
at All 
    
 
Moderately 
Probable 
    
 
Very 
Probable 
 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
18. For the case you completed, assume that you have just received an anonymous 
memo related to personnel issues.  The memo states that employee morale is 
currently poor and that there are several disgruntled employees in the organization 
who wish to discredit senior management.  The report also states that some of the 
disgruntled employees are upset because of rumors that senior managers have been 
manipulating earnings to acquire large bonuses.  Based upon this new evidence, do 
you believe that the whistle-blowing report was more likely made because of 
disgruntled employees attempting to discredit management with false accusations, 
or do you believe that the report was made because a concerned employee was 
aware of management’s manipulations of earnings? 
 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Employees 
Are Trying 
to Discredit 
Management 
    
 
I Have 
No 
Opinion 
    
 
Employee Is 
Aware of 
Manipulation 
 
19. Based on the new evidence, what is your assessment of the credibility of the 
individual who made the whistle-blowing report? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Not Credible 
at All  
    
 
Moderately 
Credible 
    
 
Completely 
Credible 
 
 
Instructions for Questions 20 – 26: 
Please answer the following questions based on you and your current organization. 
 
 
20. Your professional designations:     
      (circle all that apply)  CIA  CPA  Other _________ 
   
21. Number of years of internal audit experience:  ________ 
 
22. Number of years of tenure with this organization:  ________ 
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23. Who is primarily responsible for decisions to investigate whistle-blowing reports 
in your organization? 
 
Internal 
 Audit 
 
Audit 
Committee 
 
Other 
 (List) 
 
 
__________ 
 
24. Approximately what percentage of whistle-blowing reports received at your 
organization have been anonymous?  
 
_______ % 
 
25. Approximately what percentage of the anonymous whistle-blowing reports that 
you have investigated have been valid? (answer one) 
 
_________ %  
 
_________ I have not investigated any anonymous reports. 
 
26. Approximately what percentage of the anonymous whistle-blowing reports at 
your organization do you believe are valid? 
 
_______ % 
 
_________ I have not received any anonymous reports.  
 
Instructions for Questions 27 and 28. 
Please indicate who in your organization has responsibility for the following 
activities by circling the number that best indicates the level of unique or shared 
responsibility. 
 
27. Who is responsible for evaluating your performance?  
 
2 1 0 1 2 
 
Senior 
Management 
Is Solely 
Responsible 
 
Senior 
Management 
Is Primarily 
Responsible 
Equivalent 
Responsibility 
 
Audit Committee 
Is Primarily 
Responsible 
 
Audit Committee 
Is Solely 
Responsible 
 
28. Who approves your departmental budget? 
2 1 0 1 2 
 
Senior 
Management 
Is Solely 
Responsible 
 
Senior 
Management 
Is Primarily 
Responsible 
Equivalent 
Responsibility 
 
Audit Committee 
Is Primarily 
Responsible 
 
Audit Committee 
Is Solely 
Responsible 
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